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                                                     ABSTRACT 
 
This study makes a comparative analysis of the current biosafety legislation in South 
Africa and the interim biosafety regulatory regime in Uganda.  A set of common 
characteristics and components in biosafety regulatory systems with reference to 
related provisions of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety were used.  The 
introduction of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) especially in agriculture has 
produced a new range of governance challenges in the fields of environmental safety 
and human health.  The regulation of modern biotechnology in Africa is still in its 
infancy.   Despite this, legislation is urgently required to regulate modern 
biotechnology. The study assessed how the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety is 
implemented by South Africa and Uganda.   
 
The study revealed that though the Cartagena Protocol has gone some way in 
regulating modern biotechnology, its implementation in countries such as South 
Africa and Uganda has not resulted in the harmonization of the domestic regulatory 
process.  On the national level, the study noted that the biosafety legislation of South 
Africa and the interim biosafety regulatory regime of Uganda do not fully comply 
with the provisions of the Cartagena Protocol.  This is mainly because each country 
has taken a different approach in implementing the protocol depending on its 
domestic priorities, imperatives and position in the global agricultural market.  
Finally, the study made recommendations on possible ways in which South Africa 
and Uganda can coordinate and harmonize their national biosafety regulatory 
systems.  These will enable the two biosafety regulatory systems to become more 
compliant with the provisions of the protocol. 
 
Key Words: Genetically Modified Organisms, Modern Biotechnology, Biosafety, 
Cartagena Protocol, Interim Biosafety Regulatory Regime, South Africa, Uganda.  
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                                                  CHAPTER ONE: 
                              INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
 
‘’Biotechnology could contribute significantly to the achievement of the objectives of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity and the attainment of the Millennium Development 
Goals. However, it must be developed judiciously, and used with adequate and transparent 
safety measures’’. 
                                                     - Kofi Annan, Former United Nations Secretary-General. 
 
A. Introduction 
 
Biological processes have been used for centuries to modify food in order to improve 
taste, palatability and safety, especially by using the technique of selective breeding. 
Biotechnology is not a recent phenomenon and can be traced to fermentation and 
cheese making process developed by the Egyptians over four thousand years ago.1  
The introduction of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) especially in agriculture 
has produced a new range of governance challenges in the fields of environmental 
safety and human health.2  With the introduction of modern biotechnology, there 
have been a lot of mixed reactions and controversies.3  This has eventually led to the 
emergence of two groups.4  The first group consists of the proponents of GMOs led 
by the United States of America (USA).  The proponents of GMOs are advocates of 
the permissive approach in the regulation of modern biotechnology and GMOs.  The 
second group consists of the opponents of GMOs led by the European Union (EU).  
The opponents of GMOs are advocates of the precautionary approach in the 
regulation of modern biotechnology and GMOs.  Global rules and regulations have 
                                                 
1Bail C, The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety: Reconciling Trade in Biotechnology with Environment and 
development (Earth Scan Publications, 2002). pp. 4.  
2
 Aarti Gupta and Robert Falkner, ‘The Influence of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety: Comparing 
Mexico, China and South Africa’. pp. 23. 
3
 Mackenzie R, Burhenne-Guilmin, & La Vina A, ‘An explanatory guide to the Cartagena protocol on 
biosafety’, 2003. IUCN Environmental Law Centre, IUCN, Gland, Switzerland and Cambridge, UK. pp. 5. 
4The World Trade Organization (WTO), 2000. Shorter Articles, Comments and Notes. International Trade 
in Living Modified Organisms: The New Regimes. Available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e.htm. 
Accessed on 11 June 2007.  
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been established to govern modern biotechnology, the most recent being the 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, which is now being implemented in a growing 
number of developing countries. 
 
 It is suggested that GMOs constitute both actual and potential risks to 
biological diversity and human health.  The exact nature of these threats is still 
unknown because of the lack of in-depth research.   Given the unpredictable nature 
of modern biotechnology, and its potential to have a negative impact on the 
environment, it is wise to proceed with caution.5  By taking a precautionary 
approach in the context of the transboundary movement of GMOs, it is necessary to 
adopt a judicious blend between liberal trade and biosafety concerns.6  The 
regulation of modern biotechnology in Africa is still in its infancy.   Despite this, 
legislation is urgently required to regulate modern biotechnology.  It is now 
apparent that genetically modified organisms (GMOs) are finding their way into the 
different regions of Africa, and so are the dangers that come with them.   
 
South Africa was the first African country to enact legislation regulating 
modern biotechnology and GMOs.  South Africa’s biosafety legislation could be 
used as a reference for Uganda (that is in the process of adopting its proposed 
Biosafety Bill of 2005) and the rest of Africa in developing effective biosafety 
regulatory systems, as there are many lessons that may be learnt from it.  However, 
over the past several years Uganda has made it a priority to establish a fully 
functional biosafety regulatory regime. 
 
 This study makes a comparative analysis of the current biosafety legislation 
in South Africa and the interim biosafety regulatory regime in Uganda.  This will be 
done by comparing selected key features in both biosafety regulatory systems with 
                                                 
5
 Barron N M, ‘A Case Of Throwing Caution To The Wind: A Critical Analysis Of The EIA Provisions 
Contained In The GMO Act of South Africa’. 2003 SAJELP. pp. 94. 
6
 Asif H Qureshi, ‘The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety and the WTO-Coexistence or Incoherence?’. pp. 
835. 
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reference to related provisions of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety.  The study is 
aimed at assessing how the Cartagena Protocol is implemented in South Africa and 
Uganda, and the compliance level of the biosafety regulatory systems of the two 
countries. 
 
B.  Definition of Terms 
Biotechnology is defined as any technological application that uses biological 
systems, living organisms, or derivatives thereof, to make or modify products or 
processes for specific use.7  This includes the use of microbial, animal or plant cells 
or enzymes to synthesize, breakdown or transform materials. Biotechnology could 
be looked at from two perspectives; modern biotechnology and traditional 
biotechnology.  This study shall focus on modern biotechnology.  Genetically 
modified organisms (GMOs), also called Living modified organisms (LMOs), are 
living organisms that contain novel combinations of genetic material as a result of 
the application of biotechnology.8  
 
Genetic modification (GM) is a process used to modify life forms by 
introducing molecular material deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) from other life forms 
in order to alter their genetic make up and inheritable qualities permanently.9 
Genetic modification is different from traditional breeding of plant varieties.  To 
date the current introduction of GMOs has been in agriculture so as to enhance traits 
useful in the production or marketing of foods.10 
 
Biosafety is a collective term that refers to the safe development, transfer and 
application of biotechnology and its products.  Biosafety may also refer to the 
                                                 
7
 International Service for National Agriculture Research (ISNAR) Report No. 5, 1993. Available at 
http://www.isnar.cgiar.org/reports/pdf. Accessed on 5th June 2007. 
8
 Smith E, ‘Biotechnology’, 4th Edition, 2000, pp. 3. 
9
 Genetic modification involves three steps. The first step is identification and isolation of DNA segment or 
gene. The second step is the transfer of the isolated gene to another organism and the third step is the 
regeneration of a healthy organism after DNA transfer has been done into recipient cells. 
10
 Countries that produce GMOs include; USA, South Africa, Argentina, Mexico, China and Canada. 
Genetically modified crops include: Maize, Soya bean, Cotton and Canola. 
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mechanisms put in place to regulate or control potential risks biotechnology posses 
to human health, the environment as well as their socio-economic impacts.11 
 
C.  Historical Background and Origin of GMOs  
The knowledge on which the techniques of genetic modification are based dates 
from the 1950s, when James Watson, Francis Crick, Maurice Wilson and Rosalind 
Franklin discovered the structure of DNA, the now familiar double helix of 
nucleotides that bears the genetic information for the biosynthesis of proteins like 
enzymes, certain hormones (e.g. insulin) and whole parts of the body (e.g. nails, 
hair).12  This new understanding opened up the possibility that the genetic coding of 
organisms could be altered to give them new characteristics that natural evolution or 
selective breeding could not produce.13  In the 1970s, it became possible to isolate 
individual genes, refashion them and copy them in cells, huge commercial 
possibilities opened up.  Ways of applying this new technology to medicine were 
developed quite rapidly.  The technology could also be used in industry to produce 
new fine chemicals and pharmaceuticals using living organisms as “factories”.14 
Applying these methods successfully to plants took longer, the first genetically 
altered whole food, Flav’r Sav’r tomatoes came on the market in 1994 in the USA. 
Since then, the number and range of genetically modified products has steadily 
increased.15  
 
The technique of genetic modification differs from selective breeding mainly 
because it removes genes directly from one organism and inserts them into the DNA 
of the cells of another.  Genetic modification is faster and more exact than the 
generally random based approach applied in selective breeding.16  Importantly, it 
                                                 
11
 Republic of Uganda, National Biotechnology and Biosafety Policy, July 2003.pp.3. 
12
 Mackenzie R, op cit n3 at 6. 
13
 Royal Commission on Genetic Modification- New Zealand, Report of the Royal Commission on Genetic 
Modification- New Zealand, Auckland 2001.pp. 362.  
14
 Mackenzie R, et. al, op cit n3 at 362. 
15
 Royal Commission on Genetic Modification, op cit n13 at 362. 
16
 Teel Julie, ‘Regulating Genetically Modified Products and Processes: An overview of Approaches’, New 
York University Environmental Law Journal 8 (2000). pp. 649. 
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also opens the possibility of transferring genes across natural borders between 
different organisms.17  The commercial use of genetically modified organisms 
(GMOs) in agriculture is currently limited almost exclusively to different varieties 
from four crop species.  These include: soybeans, maize (corn), oilseed rape (canola), 
and cotton.18  In 2001, 99% of all GMO crop area world-wide was grown in four 
countries: 68% of the crop area planted with GMOs was in the USA, 22% in 
Argentina, 6% in Canada, and 3% in China. Worldwide, 46% of the total area that 
was sown with soybeans was sown with genetically modified (GM) soybean 
varieties, and for maize 7% of the total crop area was sown with GM maize 
varieties.19 
 
Since 1994 the number of GMOs that may be marketed as human food has 
increased.20  For example, up to 52 approved crop varieties (from 13 different 
species) in the USA; 43 (six different species) in Japan; 12 (five different species) in 
Australia and New Zealand; five (two different species) in the EU; and four (three 
different species) in South Africa.21  
 
D.  Responses and Regulation of Modern Biotechnology 
Various biosafety responses and regulations have been established at international 
and national level to address biosafety concerns and Genetically Modified 
Organisms (GMOs).  These include: 
 
 
                                                 
17
 Katz Deborah, ‘The Mismatch between the Biosafety Protocol and the Precautionary Principle’, 
Georgetown Environmental Law Review 13 (2001), pp. 940 & 949. 
18
 James Clive, ‘Preview: Global Status of Commercialised Transgenic Crops’: 2003, ISAAA Briefs No. 
30 (2003). Available at http://www.agbios.com/docroot/articles/04-014-001.pdf. Accessed on 15th June 
2007. 
19
 Biotechnology Industrial Organisation, Agricultural Biotech Products on the Market, available at 
www.bio.org/er/agri_products.asp>. Accessed on 15th  June 2007. 
20
 Hagen Paul E and Weiner John Barlow, ‘The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety: New rules for 
International Trade in Living Modified Organisms’, Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 
12 (2000), pp. 697, 698.   
21
 South African National Department of Agriculture, 2007 (Genetically modified organisms that have been 
cleared for commercial release and/or for food and animal feed only). Available at 
http://www.nda.agric.za/geneticresources/AnnexureB.htm. Accessed on 15th June 2007. 
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1.0. International Responses and Regulation  
There are four key international instruments that are relevant to the regulation of 
modern biotechnology, these include: 
 
1.1. Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) 
The CBD was the first international legal instrument to indicate that biotechnology 
was a matter of concern for the international community and that consideration 
should be given to adopting regulations.22  The CBD is the legal regime for the 
conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity.  The CBD was adopted in 1992 at 
the UNCED in Rio de Janeiro and was opened for signature on 5 June 1992 and 
entered into force on the 29 December 1993.23   
 
The aim of the CBD is to conserve biological diversity, the sustainable use of 
its components and the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising out of the 
utilization of genetic resources.24  The CBD encourages the parties to develop 
national strategies, plans and programmes for the conservation and sustainable use 
of biological diversity.25  The CBD further makes a provision urging the parties to 
consider need for a biosafety protocol.26  Glazewski describes the CBD as a landmark 
in environment and development, as the CBD takes for the first time a holistic and 
integrated, rather than a species-based approach, to the conservation and sustainable 
utilization of natural resources.27 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
22
 Sands P, ‘Principles of International Environmental Law’, 2003 (Second Edition). pp.655. 
23
 As at June 2007, there were 190 parties to the CBD. It is to be noted that the USA signed the Convention 
on June 5 1993, but has not yet ratified it because it lacks provisions that protect intellectual property rights 
as one of the primary grounds of not ratifying it. Available at http://www.cbd.int/biosafety/shtml. Accessed 
on 17th June 2007. 
24
 Article 1 CBD. 
25
 Article 6(a) CBD. 
26
 Article 19 (3) of the CBD. 
27
 Glazewski J, ‘Environmental Law in South Africa’, 2005.pp. 259. 
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1.2. Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 
The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (the protocol) was the key response to concerns 
about biosafety at the global level and was adopted in 2000 under the CBD.28  The 
Protocol is primarily concerned with the transboundary movements of LMOs and 
has two key concepts: biosafety and precaution.  The Protocol entered into force in 
July 2003 and has so far been signed by 37 African countries though many have not 
ratified it or developed laws to incorporate it into their legal framework.29  Since 
African countries are faced with the challenge of dealing with the transboundary 
movement of LMOs, ratification and adoption of the protocol could be a useful 
option. 
 
1.3. United Nations (UN) Guidelines for Consumer Protection 
On 16 April 1985 the United Nations General Assembly stipulated certain guidelines 
for consumer protection.30  The guidelines are important as a basis to develop 
international standards to protect consumers especially those from the developing 
countries.  Thus GMO-related legislation (especially the identification and labeling 
provisions) of the various jurisdictions should be measured against the outlined 
guidelines or principles of the UN guidelines for consumer protection. 
 
1.4. The Codex Alimentarius Commission 
The Codex Alimentarius Commission is the joint World Health Organization 
(WHO)/Food Agricultural Organization (FAO) international body charged with the 
development of food standards.  The World Trade Organization as being consistent 
with the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Standards (SPS) Agreement recognizes its standards.  Since its 
inception in 1961, this body has drawn world attention to the field of food quality 
and safety.  The Commission has encouraged food-related scientific and 
                                                 
28
 Signed in Montreal on 29th January 2000. 
29
 Convention on Biological Diversity website available at http://www.cbd.int/biosafety/shtml. Accessed on 
17th June 2007.  
30
 This was through the adoption of Resolution A/Res 39/248.   
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technological research as well as discussion.  It has given top priority to the 
protection and interests of consumers in the formulation of food standards and 
related activities.  
 
2.0. African Regional Responses and Regulation  
The African Biosafety Model Law was adopted by the African Union (AU) in July 
2001,31 and urged member states to use the African Biosafety Model Law to draft 
their own national legal instruments.  This Model Law reflects a broad consensus on 
issues of biotechnology development and its regulatory framework utilizes the 
discretion given by the Cartagena Protocol for countries to adopt more stringent 
protective measures than the agreed minimum set out in the Protocol.  
 
The Model Law further recognizes Africa as a centre and origin of diversity 
with regard to food and other crops and also makes a provision for consideration of 
socio-economic factors in assessing risks and opportunities.32  The key Legal 
principles and approaches incorporated in the African Biosafety Model Law include 
precaution, state sovereignty on decisions regarding GMOs, and a liability and 
redress regime.  The Model Law provides a holistic and comprehensive set of 
biosafety rules including those that are not dealt with by the Protocol.33 
 
3.0. African Sub-Regional Responses and Regulation  
In Africa six regional economic communities, namely: the Economic Commission of 
West African States (ECOWAS), the East African Community (EAC), the Economic 
Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Intergovernmental Authority on 
Development (IGAD), the South African Development Community (SADC), and the 
Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) have taken the lead in developing policy guidance on 
GMO research, production and marketing in their respective regions.  The SADC 
                                                 
31
 74th Ordinary Session in Lusaka, Zambia. 
32
 Jaffe G, ‘Comparative Analysis of the National Biosafety Regulatory Systems in East Africa’, EPT 
Discussion paper, January 2006. Pp.32.  Available at www.ifpri.org last accessed on 20th June 2007. 
33
 Mayet M, Comments On The Ugandan National Biosafety Framework, September 
2004. http://www.biosafetyafrica.net/uganda.htm . Accessed on 20th June 2007. 
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established an advisory committee on GMOs and the EAC also recommended 
reviewing and developing a common policy on GMOs. 
 
4.0. National Responses and Regulation  
There is need for harmonized and adequate national policies and laws to regulate 
biotechnology in Africa at the national levels. At least nine African countries 
including Uganda and South Africa have biosafety legislation, policy or guidelines 
to address the issue of biosafety and the regulation of GMOs. Biosafety legislation in 
South Africa consists of the Genetically Modified Organisms (GMO) Act,34 the 
Genetically Modified Organisms (GMO) Regulations, and more recently the 
Genetically Modified Organisms (GMO) Amendment Act,35 while the interim 
biosafety regulatory regime of Uganda consists of the Draft National Biotechnology 
and Biosafety Policy, 36 and the Draft Biosafety Regulations.37  Developed country 
aid agencies and international organizations have taken keen interest in supporting 
the development of an enabling legal environment for transgenic research and 
biosafety.  The AU biosafety capacity building project has also spearheaded the 
harmonization of biosafety legislation between member states based on the African 
Biosafety Model Law.   
 
E.  Arguments for and Against Modern Biotechnology and GMOs 
With the introduction of GM technology there has been a lot of controversy and 
mixed reactions to this new technology and this eventually led to the emergence of 
two groups.38  The first group consists of the proponents of GMOs and the second 
group consists of the opponents of GMOs.   The views on the benefits offered by 
genetically modified organisms, and the extent to which those benefits might be 
                                                 
34
 Republic of South Africa, Act 15 of 1997. 
35
 Republic of South Africa, Act 23 of 2006. 
36
 Republic of Uganda, July 2003. 
37
 Republic of Uganda, October 2003. 
38
 Controversies over GMOs begun in Europe, where food safety was an important issue because of several 
unrelated incidents such as the “mad cow” disease that resulted in the EC ban on beef imports from Britain. 
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cancelled by the potential risks that GMOs pose to human health and the 
environment, are polarized.39   
 
The advocates for GMOs, including the immensely powerful biotech 
industries, focus on the infinite potential applications for such revolutionary 
techniques. Emphasis is laid on the costs and energy savings that can be reaped by 
the agricultural sector in the form of reduced net input costs (including costs of 
pesticides and labour), increased profits,40 and enhanced yields that will reduce 
agricultural clearing and thereby lessen habitat loss, and damage to the environment 
and biodiversity.41  Amongst the more captivating innovations that GM technology 
has to offer is crops with more nutritional value, increased shelf life, and insecticide 
and herbicide resistant crops.  More important than all these claims, however, has 
been the assertion that GM technology holds the key to famine and starvation by 
availing more food to feed the malnourished people and the promise that genetic 
modification could be used to overcome difficulties of poor arable land and drought. 
With regard to health benefits GM technology enables specialty in chemicals such as 
pharmaceuticals that provide better health care possibilities. 
 
On the other hand the critics of GM technology argue that it posses 
significant economic risks, including the failure of the technology to deliver the 
promised benefits.42  There are concerns that a GM crop could transfer modified 
genes to wild relatives43 and potentially create a super weed, or could its self become 
a weed, potentially threatening biodiversity.44  Critics of GMOs have also raised 
                                                 
39
 Hughes D; Jewell T; Lowther T; Environmental Law 4th edition, 2002.pp. 352.   
40
 These profits have to be shared by the farmers using the technology and the Manufacturers. 
41
 Adler J H, ‘Cartagena Protocol: Biosafety or Bio-sorry?’, 12:3 Georgetown International Environmental 
Law Review (2000).pp. 761 at 772. 
42
 Bail C, op cit n1 at 8. 
43
 Research has documented that transfer of GM pollen by wind, rain, birds, insects, fungi, and bacteria can 
transport pollen over great distances no matter what the separation distance between GM crops and 
traditional crops. 
44
 Lappe M & Bailey B, ‘Against the Grain: The Genetic Transformation of Global Agriculture’ (1999). 
Available at http://www4.fao.org/cgi-bin/faobib.exe. See also Krimsky S & Wrubel S, ‘Agricultural 
Biotechnology and the Environment; Science, policy and Social issues’. 1996. Available at 
http://www.springerlink.com/content/. Accessed on 22nd  June 2007. 
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health concerns that development of new foods, through transgenic transformations, 
may also have the potential to create new allergic risks and enhanced toxicity 
though such risks may be difficult to detect through current testing methods and 
manifest themselves only over time.45  Of further concern is the extent to which GM 
technology has the capacity to enslave agricultural producers to biotech companies 
as was illustrated in the case of Monsanto v Schmeiser46 through dependency on GM 
technology and intellectual property rights.47  For example in India farmers pay an 
extra US$50-65 per acre as a ‘technical fee’ over and above the price of seed.48  
 
Lastly, there are ethical objections to GM technology.  The main thrust of this 
argument is that GM technology is “unnatural”, an unwarranted tampering with 
nature which ought to be avoided, ‘for all the decline in formal religion, there 
remains a deep rooted belief that we tinker with nature at our peril’. 49 However, it is 
these latter objections that do not deal with the potential risks posed by GMOs, 
which add to the complexity of regulating genetically modified organisms.50 
 
F. Statement of the Problem  
Genetically modified organisms are increasingly becoming a source of 
environmental risks.  The environmental risks associated with modern 
biotechnology and GMOs have not yet been scientifically proven as there is still 
insufficient evidence as to what environmental risks they may pose.  This has 
necessitated the adoption of some kind of international regulation of biotechnology 
such as the Cartagena Protocol.  Though a precautionary approach has been adopted 
                                                 
45
 In a surprising reversal of traditional political priorities, the force of concerns related to human health 
risks have been at the very least equaled by the pressure arising out of environmental concerns.  
46
 [2004] SCC 34. In interpreting the word ‘use’ in Section 42, the majority of the judges used the plain 
meaning of the word, its purpose in Section 42, its context and the case law. By their interpretation, Mr. 
Schmeiser did use the patented invention in a way that deprived the inventor of the full benefit of the 
monopoly granted by the patent. 
47
 Campbell T, ‘Will Biotechnology feed the World’s poor?, Development Studies Centre, Kimmage Manor 
Dublin,1998. Available at http://www.pmac.net/campbell.htm. Accessed on 23rd June 2007. 
48
 Farmers doing business with Monsanto’s herbicide-resistant crop seeds must sign a contract stating that 
they will not buy herbicides or other chemicals from other companies. 
49
 Hughes D, op cit n39 at 355. 
50
 Ernestine M and Richard S, ‘The GM Cold War: How Developing Countries can go from being Dominos 
to Being Players’. RECIEL 13 (3) 2004.pp.247. 
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by many states, some states especially the developing countries including South 
Africa and Uganda do not have the capacity to regulate trade in GMOs due to a 
number of factors like poverty, corruption, undemocratic governance and, hunger.  
This has generated fears that developing countries are fast becoming dumping 
grounds and testing centers for GMOs and this may be harmful in the long run.  
 
The trade in transgenic crops and GMOs is mostly carried out between 
developed and developing countries.  This has created a need to protect developing 
countries from the risks posed by the GMOs since most of them are not in a position 
to bargain with the more powerful developed countries that export GMOs and the 
rich multi national corporations like Monsanto that produce GMOs.  Though the 
Cartagena Protocol is aimed at addressing the needs and interests of the developing 
countries including South Africa and Uganda, these countries are still faced with 
many challenges that they are yet to overcome so as to effectively implement the 
Protocol. 
 
Biosafety legislation in South Africa and the interim biosafety regulatory 
regime in Uganda is an illustration of the many hurdles that other developing 
countries especially African countries are facing in implementing the Protocol.  
Thus, this study therefore makes a comparison of the interim biosafety regulatory 
regime of Uganda and the existing biosafety legislation in South Africa. This is done 
by examining how the two countries have integrated their international obligations 
under the Protocol, in developing biosafety regulatory frameworks that are relevant 
to them and can easily be implemented. 
 
G. Objective and Scope of the study 
Though there is still insufficient scientific evidence concerning the risks associated 
with biotechnology and GMOs many countries have adopted specific national laws 
to regulate modern biotechnology.  As a consequence of the fact that the borders of 
countries do not restrict many of the problems associated with biotechnology many 
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states have adopted international solutions.  These include the Cartagena Protocol 
specifically designed to deal with international challenges presented by GMOs and 
countries like South Africa and Uganda have had to implement the Protocol by 
integrating it in their domestic legislation on Biosafety.  
 
The overall aim of the study is to make a comparative analysis of the 
biosafety legislation in South Africa and the interim biosafety regulatory regime of 
Uganda by comparing selected key features with the aim of determining their 
compliance with related provisions of the Protocol.  The specific objectives of this 
study are: to give an overview of the international regulation of biotechnology with 
focus on the Cartagena Protocol.  This will facilitate an assessment as to what extent 
the biosafety legislation in South Africa and the interim biosafety regulatory regime 
of Uganda have or will enable them to fulfill their international obligations with 
regard to biosafety.  Lastly, the study aims at assessing whether both these biosafety 
regulatory systems have or will be of relevance in addressing the biosafety needs of 
Uganda and South Africa. 
 
The biosafety legislation in South Africa and the interim biosafety regulatory 
regime of Uganda have been chosen for this study by comparing the different 
features in their biosafety legislation.  South Africa was chosen for this study 
because it is considered as the “gateway” for GMOs in Africa and it has also enacted 
a Biosafety Act and perhaps Uganda could pick some tips as well as learn some 
lessons from South Africa before it finally adopts its Biosafety Bill of 2005. 
 
However, the study does have some limitations.  First, it examines the Draft 
National Biotechnology and Biosafety Policy and the Draft National Biosafety 
Regulations in Uganda.  Both these biosafety regulatory policies are operating on an 
interim basis and are still in draft form.  This is because the Biosafety Bill of 2005 has 
not yet been enacted into law.  Since the Biosafety Policy is still in “draft” form, the 
analysis advanced in relation to legislation in both countries especially Uganda may 
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not be relevant if a biosafety Act is enacted.  Secondly, it is imperative to note that 
environmental law is a very dynamic discipline and enactment of legislation is a 
political matter that is often influenced and delayed by politicians due to many 
factors.  This may make some findings of this study inconsistent with the changed 
circumstances.  Lastly, it cannot be claimed that this study is comprehensively 
exhaustive.  
 
H. Structure of the study/ Chapter synopsis 
So as to achieve its aims and objectives, this study consists of four chapters.  Chapter 
one which is the introduction gives the historical background of biotechnology and 
GMOs, the historical development, arguments for and against GMOs, the problem 
statement, scope and objective of the study, structure of the study, and the research 
methodology.  Chapter two gives an overview of the Cartagena Protocol by 
examining the provisions of the Protocol in more detail.  Chapter three considers the 
domestic implementation of the Cartagena Protocol focusing on biosafety legislation 
in South Africa and the interim biosafety legislation in Uganda by carrying out a 
comparative analysis.  Related provisions of the Protocol are used as the basis of this 
study.  Lastly, chapter four presents the overall conclusion and also makes some 
recommendations. 
 
I. Research Methodology 
This is a largely a desktop based study which includes an analysis of the literature 
including the relevant primary and secondary sources of data.  Newspaper articles 
and internet resources were used where appropriate.  A comparative analysis of the 
biosafety legislation of South Africa on the one hand, and the interim biosafety 
regulatory regime of Uganda on the other hand was carried out.  This was essential 
in satisfying the objectives of the study and understanding the intricacies that are 
generally associated with GMOs and modern biotechnology.  Furthermore, it 
enabled an understanding of the specific challenges that are faced by the developing 
countries including Uganda and South Africa in this regard.  The literature study 
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was essential in analyzing the domestic implementation of the Cartagena protocol 
that was discussed in the study.  In addition, decided cases and documents 
published by international organizations and Non-Governmental Organizations 
(NGOs) were considered.  Selected Key features of the Protocol are examined in 
detail in the next chapter. 
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                                         CHAPTER TWO: 
     THE CARTAGENA PROTOCOL ON BIOSAFETY: AN OVERVIEW 
 
The Cartagena protocol is one of the international agreements that have been 
concluded to regulate the transboundary movement of genetically modified 
organisms (GMOs).  The Cartagena Protocol provides special rules and procedures 
for international regulation of GMOs.  The Protocol has its base in concerns of 
developing countries, that because of capacity limitations, they will not be able to 
control effectively which GM products cross their borders or regulate adequately 
their use.51  The Protocol is generally considered to have a more developing country-
orientated position.52   Selected key provisions of the Cartagena Protocol will be 
examined in the present chapter. 
 
A. Historical Background  
The issue of Biosafety emerged for the first time in the context of a global legally 
binding instrument during the negotiations of the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD). GMOs constitute a potential risk to the biological diversity but the 
CBD does not specifically deal with the issue of GMOs.  However, it is of direct 
relevance to the creation of protection regimes for all biological resources and 
biodiversity generally at the international level.53  The CBD provides that each 
contracting party shall, as far as possible and appropriate, “establish or maintain 
means to regulate, manage or control the risks associated with the use and release of 
living modified organisms (LMOs),54 resulting from technology which are likely to 
have adverse environmental impacts that could effect the conservation and the 
                                                 
51
 Zarilli S, ‘International Trade in Genetically Modified Organisms and Multilateral Negotiations: A New 
Dilemma for Developing Countries’ (UN Conference on Trade and Development, 2000). pp.17. Available 
at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/poditctncdd1.en.pdf. Accessed on 25th June 2007. 
52
 Zarilli S, Ibid. 
53
 In this context the CBD broadly delimits the rights of states and other relevant actors over biological 
resources. 
54
 It is to be noted that, instead of GMO, the term LMO is used, this being the language of the Convention. 
However, because the definition LMO is largely consistent with that of GMO, the terms will be used 
interchangeably in this study. 
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sustainable use of biological diversity, taking also into account the risks to human 
health”.55  The basis for doing so was not specifically set out in the CBD but was left 
for future determination by a Protocol at a future date.56 The CBD states that, “the 
Parties shall consider the need for and modalities of a Protocol setting out 
appropriate procedures, including, in particular, Advanced Informed Agreement 
(AIA), in the field of the safe transfer, handling and use of any LMO resulting from 
biotechnology that may have an adverse effect on the conservation and sustainable 
use of biological diversity”.57 
 
In 1994, at the first meeting of the Conference of the parties (COP), 
preparatory works were authorized in this regard based on these findings.  The 
second COP set up the open-ended Ad Hoc Working Group on biosafety with a 
view to draft a protocol, which would especially focus on the transboundary 
movement of GMOs.58  The Working Group was scheduled to forward the draft to 
the first Extra Ordinary Meeting of the COP to the CBD (ExCOP) immediately after 
its sixth meeting, held in 1999 in Cartagena.  However, the negotiators failed to reach 
a compromise at this meeting in February 1999 in Cartagena,59 Columbia from 
where incidentally the Protocol derives its nomenclature.60  Thus, the meeting had to 
be suspended. After informal meetings the ExCOP was eventually resumed in 
January 2000 in Montreal where the Protocol was finally adopted on 29 January 
2000.61  
 
                                                 
55
 Article 8(g) CBD. 
56
 Article 28 CBD. 
57
 Article 19(3) CBD. 
58
 COP Decision II/5, which established the so-called Jakarta Mandate. Discussed further in Kiss A & 
Shelton D, `International Environmental Law’, 2003 (Third Edition), pp. 267. 
59
 A group of six countries (Canada, Australia, Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay) headed by the USA clashed 
with a coalition formed by the European Union and a bloc of over 100 ‘like minded’ developing countries. 
The former wanted a zero-option approach, which would facilitate international trade in LMOs, while the 
latter wanted a comprehensive safety regime. See J. Glazewski, op cit n27 at 318. 
60
 Aaron C & Stas Burgiel, ‘The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety: An analysis of results’, An IISD Briefing 
Note. (2000). pp. 6. 
61
 See Kiss A, op cit n58 at 630 for decision EM- I/3, UNEP/CBD/ExCOP/1/3, Annex. 
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The Protocol was opened for signature in May 2000, at the fifth COP to the 
CBD.  The required number of fifty parties was attained in June 2003 and, in 
accordance with the provisions of Article 37 of the Protocol, the Protocol entered into 
force in September 2003.  South Africa is a party but has not yet signed the protocol 
despite having participated actively in its negotiation.  As of June 2007, the protocol 
had 143 parties and 101 parties had signed the protocol. 
 
1.0. The Major Negotiating Groups at the Cartagena Meetings 
Five major groups had emerged by the final days of the Cartagena meetings.  The 
first group consisted of the ‘Miami Group’.  The Miami group represented the major 
exporters of GMO crops and seeds, and the developed countries among them have 
some of the world’s most advanced biotechnology industries.62  This group’s interest 
was to enable free trade of such genetically modified products without burdensome 
bureaucratic approval procedures, and with out allowing room for “protectionist” 
trade barriers disguised as environmental protection.63  The second group was the 
‘Like Minded’ Group which was the largest negotiating group.64  They supported 
the Protocol, in light of the unknown effects of LMOs on the environment and 
human health, and given the need to protect countries without adequate regulatory 
or institutional capacity to effectively handle LMO imports.  The Like Minded 
Group supported a strong statement of the precautionary principle, and was the 
prime backer of tough and concrete text on liability and redress. 
 
 The third negotiating group was the European Union (EU), which negotiated 
as a bloc throughout the biosafety negotiations.65  Regarding the scope, the EU had 
                                                 
62
 The Miami group consisted of countries like Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, USA, and Uruguay. 
Their aim was to keep LMO-FFP outside the scope of the protocol’s AIA procedure arguing that goods 
traded in these volumes were not amenable to the AIA, since such products were safe for consumption and 
not intended for introduction in the environment, their biodiversity impacts were minimal.  
63
 Zarilli S, op cit n51at 18. 
64
 The Like Minded Group consisted mainly of developing countries and they called for a comprehensive 
scope, including LMO-FFPs, arguing that seeds and other LMO products intended for consumption might 
actually be planted in many developing countries. 
65
 Given the public outrage over food safety scandals such as the mad cow disease and the dioxin-tainted 
chicken, the EU strove for a strong protocol including coverage of risks to human health. 
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pushed for inclusion of living modified organisms intended for direct use as food or 
feed, or for processing (LMO-FFPs), while acknowledging that they might merit 
special treatment under the AIA procedure.  They also supported the precautionary 
principle and alternative considerations for contained use, transit and 
pharmaceuticals for humans.  
 
The fourth group was the ‘Compromise Group’ that came up during the final 
days of the Cartagena negotiations.  The Compromise group’s specific intent was to 
bridge the major gaps between the other negotiating groups by developing 
compromise positions and alternative formulations.66  The Group’s inclusion of 
countries with high levels of biodiversity as well as those with advanced biotech 
industries provided additional cache for addressing the range of concerns of 
developed and developing countries.67  
 
Lastly, the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) also emerged as a separate 
negotiating bloc during the final days of the Cartagena and generally reflected a 
“middle-of –the–road” position.68  With general support for including LMO-FFPs, 
the precautionary principle and preambular references to other international 
agreements, the CEE focused primarily on the practicality and applicability of 
various proposals.  
 
2.0. The Major Issues of Debate at the Cartagena Negotiations 
During the Cartagena negotiations there were some major issues of debate.  This 
section explains how these issues divided the five major negotiating groups, and 
what the results of the Protocol meant for each party.  The first issue concerned the 
scope of the Protocol.  The central question here was whether the Protocol should 
                                                 
66
 The Compromise Group consisted of countries like Japan, Mexico, Norway, Singapore, South Korea, 
and Switzerland and, in Montreal, New Zealand. The Group did have joint positions supporting a 
comprehensive scope and the precautionary principle, although they acknowledged internal difference 
about the saving clause. 
67
 Aaron C & Stas Burgiel, op cit n60 at 7. 
68
 Aaron C & Stas Burgiel, supra. The CEE did not represent a divergent position in its own right, often 
falling in line either with the EU or the Like Minded Group. 
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cover a class of LMOs known as LMO-FFPs, LMOs that are intended for direct use 
as food or feed for processing.69  It was finally agreed that LMOs-FFPs would fall 
under the Protocol’s scope and negotiators then focused on whether they would fall 
under the scope of the Protocol’s AIA provisions.  
 
The second issue of debate concerned the precautionary principle.70 
Negotiations turned on the question of how to operationalise the precautionary 
principle.  Some contented that any restrictions had to be based on sound science 
and rigorous risk assessment, as the precautionary principle could be used as an 
excuse to restrict trade in harmless goods in order to protect domestic producers. 
Others argued that the sound science argument was itself an excuse to limit the use 
of an established principle of international environmental law.  
 
The third issue concerned the relationship of the Protocol to other 
International Agreements.71 But the body of law foremost in the negotiators’ minds 
however was the multilateral system of trade rules embodied in the World Trade 
Organization (WTO.)  The concern was what would happen if the trade related 
provisions of the Protocol were challenged in the WTO/GATT or if a country was 
challenged for implementing the Protocol in a trade restrictive manner as was 
illustrated by the Biotech Disputes Case.72  In previous negotiations the argument 
                                                 
69
 Those that opposed the inclusion of such LMOs in the Protocol, argued that since such LMOs were not to 
be introduced in the environment, they posed no threat to biodiversity, and should there fore not be 
included in the Protocol. Those that supported the inclusion of such LMOs in the Protocol argued that it 
was not possible to ensure that that this category of LMOs would not in fact be released into the 
environment, whatever the intention. They also argued that the Protocol should take into account the 
Human health risks (Health risks from biodiversity impacts and direct contact (allergies)) of LMOs-FFPs, 
rather than on food safety grounds. 
70
 The precautionary principle is widely used in international environmental law and it is, as some contend, 
a principle of customary international law (See for example, P. Sands, op cit n8 at 212.) 
71
  The other agreements in question include the Law of the Sea, international transit and transportation 
arrangements, and international health agreements that address human pharmaceuticals. 
72
 (2006).In this case the complainants were USA, Canada & Argentina and the contested the EC’s 
suspension of approvals as it was a breach of the SPS and other WTO Agreements. They argued that only 
the WTO Agreements were applicable. The EC argued that the CBD and the Protocol were directly 
relevant. The panel held that the CBD and the Protocol were not applicable and the complainants were not 
parties and the legal status of the precautionary principle in international law remains unsettled. The Panel 
further held that the EC acted inconsistently with its obligations under the SPS Agreement. 
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boiled down to whether to insert a ‘saving clause’ stating that nothing in the 
agreement shall alter the rights and obligations of the parties under existing 
international law.73  The intent of the saving clause was to establish that in the case 
of conflict, the existing WTO rules would trump those of the Protocol.  
 
The last issue of debate concerned liability and redress.  The question here 
was whether, and in what form to create a liability and redress mechanism for any 
damage resulting from the transboundary movements of LMOs.  Proponents argued 
that if such a mechanism was exercised, then by definition there would have been a 
need for it, if it were never exercised, no harm would result from its inclusion.  This 
argument is strongly supported.  The question of ‘whether’ was settled by the time 
of Montreal meeting, leaving just the questions of ‘how’ and ‘when’ open to the 
negotiators.74 
 
B.  Objective and Purpose of the protocol 
Reflecting the CBD mandate, the objective of the protocol is to contribute to ensuring 
an adequate level of protection in the field of safe transfer, handling and the use of 
LMOs that may have adverse effects on the conservation and sustainable use of 
biological diversity with specific focus on transboundary movements in accordance 
with the precautionary approach contained in principle 15 of the Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development.75  Generally, the purpose of the Protocol is to 
regulate transboundary movements of LMOs with the aim of eliminating or 
minimizing their adverse effects to the environment and human health. 
 
C.  Selected Key Provisions of the Protocol 
This section of the study discusses and examines selected key features of the 
Cartagena Protocol which include: 
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 Aaron C & Stas Burgiel, op cit n60 at 3. 
74
 Barron N M, op cit n5 at 123. 
75
 Article 1 of the Protocol. 
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1.0. Scope and application 
The scope of the Cartagena Protocol is established under Article 4, which specifies in 
what circumstances a party must apply the provisions of the protocol by specifying 
the activities,76 and organisms to which the protocol applies.  Article 4 of the 
Cartagena Protocol states that, the Cartagena Protocol shall apply to the 
transboundary movement, transit, handling and use of all living modified organisms 
(LMOs) that may have adverse effects on the biological diversity, taking also into 
account the risks to human health. Some of the terms used in Article 4 are closely 
linked to Articles 5 and 6.77   
 
As stated earlier in (2.0 of part A) the scope of the protocol was the subject of 
controversy during the negotiations as the developing countries pushed for the 
application of the protocol to all LMOs and the developed countries (led by the 
United States of America) in general pushed for a more limited scope of the 
protocol.78  The structure and content of Articles 4, 5, and 6 of the protocol reflects 
the compromises finally agreed upon by the parties in Montreal, Canada, in January 
2000. 
 
2.0. Advanced Informed Agreement (AIA) 
The key mechanism and the centerpiece of transparency framework of the Cartagena 
Protocol is the Advance Informed Agreement procedure (AIA).  The AIA requires 
that before the first intentional transboundary movement of a specific LMO into its 
jurisdiction, the Party of import is notified of the proposed transboundary 
movement, receives information about the LMO and its proposed use, and is also 
given an opportunity to decide whether or not to allow the import of the LMO, and 
                                                 
76
 The activities are transboundary movement (intentional and unintentional) that is defined in Article 3(k), 
transit (though the protocol does not contain a definition of transit) and, handling and use (though the 
protocol only contains a definition for contained use in Article 3(b)). 
77Article 5 exempts, under certain conditions, the transboundary movement of one specific class of LMOs 
which are pharmaceuticals for humans from the applicability of the protocol and Article 6 provides a more 
limited exemption as it exempts LMOs in transit and LMOs destined for contained use from the application 
of the AIA procedure. 
78
 Mackenzie R, op cit n3 at 53. 
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upon what conditions if any.79  This is in fact a form of prior informed consent 
procedure (PIC) as used in the Basel and Rotterdam Conventions.80  
 
2.1. Scope of application of the AIA procedure 
The scope of application of the AIA procedure is laid out in Article 7(1) and 7(2).81 
Article 7(1) states that the AIA procedure shall apply prior to the first intentional 
transboundary movement of LMOs for “intentional introduction into the 
environment”.  This phrase is however not defined in the protocol.82  However, on 
the face of Article 7(1), it may be somewhat unclear whether AIA will be required 
each time a particular LMO is imported into a Party for the first time from a “new” 
Party of export, or whether it only applies the first time a particular LMO is 
imported into the Party of import from any Party – after which, assuming the first 
import is allowed, imports of the same LMO should be allowed under the same 
conditions from all Parties.83  Instead Article 7(2) confusingly specifies that the term 
“intentional introduction” does not refer to LMOs intended for direct use as food or 
feed, or for processing.  
 
Article 7(4) contains a different kind of exception regarding LMOs in transit, 
LMOs destined for contained use and LMOs identified in a “collective” decision of 
the COP as being not likely to have adverse effects.84  The Protocol gives no 
guidance as to what information or evidence might be required to support such a 
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 Mackenzie R, op cit n3 at 63. 
80
 Gupta Aarti, ‘Framing “Biosafety” in an international context: The Biosafety Protocol Negotiations’, 
New York 1999, pp. 5. Some countries were however concerned that the use of the term ‘prior informed 
consent procedure’ could induce the perception that LMOs were as dangerous as hazardous wastes and 
chemicals and therefore, pushed for a replacement of this term by “advance informed agreement”. 
81
 The obligations that are applicable to the LMOs covered by the scope of the AIA are mainly contained in 
Articles 8, 9, 10, 12, and 15 and Annex III of the Protocol. 
82
 During the negotiation of the Protocol, there was some debate as to whether the AIA procedure should 
apply to every transboundary movement of an LMO into a Party or only to the first transboundary 
movement of a specific LMO into a Party of import. 
83
 The use of the word “intentional” in Article 7(1) also raises certain interpretative issues: First, in the 
phrase “intentional transboundary movement of LMOs”, the word “intentional” might be interpreted as 
referring either to the transboundary movement or to the LMOs, or to both. Second, Article 7(1) and 7(2) 
refer to “intentional introduction into the environment”, but do not specify whose intention is relevant here. 
84
 Alexander Behrens, (Unpublished Masters Thesis), ‘A legal analysis of MEAs dealing with hazardous 
products and hazardous waste’. University of Cape Town, ( 2004).pp 46 
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conclusion. Nonetheless, any such decision would need to be taken in the light of the 
precautionary approach.  So in practical terms the AIA procedure will apply 
particularly to the growing of agricultural crops, the release of fish and of modified 
microorganisms.85  
 
2.2. Notification 
Article 8 addresses the first step in the AIA procedure, which is the notification of 
the proposed transboundary movement to the Party into which the LMO is to be 
imported.  According to Article 8 (1), the exporting country or the exporter shall 
notify the importing country prior to the first intentional transboundary movement 
of an LMO that falls with in the scope of the AIA procedure under Article 7(1).86  The 
notification must take place before the first transboundary movement of the LMO 
into the Party of import is initiated.  The notification shall contain, at a minimum, 
the information specified in Annex I.87   
 
Article 8 places the primary obligation regarding notification on the Party of 
export.  However Article 8 does not specify in what language the notification should 
be made whether it is the language of the Party of export, the Party of import, or 
some other language.88  As with other provisions of the Protocol, in order to be 
effective, Article 8 will need to be implemented in the domestic law of Parties in 
relation to both exports and imports of LMOs.  Article 8(2) obliges the Party of 
import to require the exporter to provide accurate information about the LMO under 
national law.  The information referred to here is that required for the notification, as 
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 Mackenzie R, op cit n3 at 65. 
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 The limitation of the procedure to the ‘first’ intentional transboundary movement is not explicitly stated 
in Article 8(1), but results from Article 7(1). 
87
 Annex I covers a wide range of information, which may be loosely grouped into three categories: first, is 
information concerning the LMO itself aimed at providing the importing country with factual information; 
second, the regulatory status in the exporting party intended to inform the country of import about the cost 
benefit assessment of the state of origin; and lastly, the suggested methods for the safe handling and use.  
88
 In practice, this issue is likely to be dealt with in national legislation of the Party of import on import 
procedures for LMOs. 
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indicated in Annex I.89 Information provided under Article 8 may be subject to 
confidentiality requirements in accordance with Article 21. 
 
2.3. Acknowledgement of receipt 
Article 9 requires the importing state to acknowledge receipt of the information to 
the notifier with in 90 days of its receipt.90  The acknowledgement shall include the 
date of receipt of the notification,91 information whether to proceed according to the 
procedure specified in Article 10, or according to the domestic regulatory framework 
of the party of import that shall be consistent with the protocol.92  The purpose of the 
acknowledgement of receipt of notification is to confirm receipt to the notifier and to 
confirm on a preliminary basis whether the notification is in order and that it 
contains the required information.  Finally under Article 9(4), if the Party of import 
fails to acknowledge receipt of a notification within the 90-day deadline, its consent 
to the proposed transboundary movement is not automatically implied.  
 
2.4. Decision procedure 
Article 10 of the Protocol sets out the procedure to be followed by the Party of 
import in reaching its decision. This decision is whether to allow the first 
transboundary movement of a LMO into its territory.  Article 10(1) states that 
decisions taken by the importing party shall be in accordance with Article 15.  The 
main requirements of Article 15(1) is that risk assessments in accordance with Annex 
III be carried out in a scientifically sound manner and must be aimed at evaluating 
the possible adverse effects of LMOs.93 Article 10(2) provides that the importing state 
shall, together with the acknowledgement of receipt, notify to the exporting state as 
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 The requirement applies whether or not, under the domestic law of the Party of export, it is the Party of 
export itself or the exporter who is required to notify the Party of import of the proposed transboundary 
movement of LMOs. 
90
 Article 9 (1). 
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 Confirmation of the date of receipt of the notification is important in that it is this date which marks the 
beginning of the 270-day period within which the Party of import should reach its import decision under 
Article 10. 
92
 Article 9(2) 
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 Risk assessment is addressed in more detail in Article 15 and Annex III to the Protocol. 
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to whether the transaction shall proceed only after the party of import has given a 
written consent or after no less than 90 days with out a written consent.94  
 
If the importing state opts for a written consent, Article 10(3) defines the time 
limit for an import decision and the possible content of that decision which is 270 
days whether or not consent is granted, whether the period of 270 days shall be 
extended, or whether additional information is required.  Except in a case where the 
consent is unconditional, the importing country shall also disclose the reasons on 
which its decision was based in accordance with Article 10(4).  The reasons given for 
a decision are likely to be important in the event that the notifier wishes to challenge 
the decision or where the notifier subsequently requests the review of the decision. 
The negotiators of the Cartagena Protocol were faced with a question of which rules 
to apply, if the importing party fails to communicate its decision.  
 
Article 10(5) states the failure to communicate, “shall not imply its consent” 
to the transboundary movement.  However, Article 15 does not specifically state 
what rules will apply in this case.  From the different wording of the provision, one 
can conclude that after a comparative analysis of Article 11(7),95 Article 10(5) must be 
read as requiring explicit consent before any transboundary movement can 
commence.  This provision is largely intended to protect countries which may, for 
whatever reason, have been unable to communicate a response within the 270-day 
period specified.  However, it is not intended to make way for an open-ended undue 
delay.  
 
Lastly, another important aspect that is not specifically catered for in the 
Protocol is the question whether exporting countries are bound to enforce consent 
                                                 
94
 This means that it is up to every importing state to decide, on the merits of each single case, whether it 
wishes the application of the consent requirement. In practice, a Party of import may select to impose a 
general requirement in its national legislation for written consent prior to the first import of a specific 
LMO. 
95
 Article 11(7) provides that a failure by a Party to communicate its decision “shall not imply its consent or 
refusal to the import”. 
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requirements, i.e. to allow the export only in cases where written consent has been 
notified by the importing country. The Protocol does not contain an explicit 
obligation on his regard. Nevertheless, as one of the main purposes of any procedure 
of prior informed consent is that exporting countries have to enforce importing 
countries’ decisions.  
 
2.5. Procedure for LMOs intended for direct use as FFPs 
LMO-FFPs are not subject to the AIA procedure that covers other LMOs, but are 
covered by a separate, less restrictive, procedure outlined in Article 11.  These 
include: 
 
2.5.1. Notification of National Regulations 
According to Article 11(1), a party that makes a final decision regarding domestic 
use of a LMO-FFP that may be subject to transboundary movement shall inform the 
parties through the ‘Biosafety Clearing-House’ (BCH) system with in 15 days of 
reaching that decision.96 This notification shall contain the information as set out in 
Annex II,97 and corresponds in large part to the information required in notifications 
made under Article 8 of the Protocol, although there are some significant 
differences.98  
 
The purposes of the notification to the BCH under Article 11(1) are to put 
other Parties “on notice” that the LMO in question may be exported for food, feed or 
processing use and to provide relevant information on that LMO that another Party 
can use when deciding whether or not to allow the import of that LMO for food, 
feed or for processing in its territory.99  It is therefore essential that all Parties have 
                                                 
96
 The Biosafety Clearing House is the key mechanism of the Cartagena Protocol for centralized 
information exchange. 
97
 Annex II contains information required concerning LMOs intended for direct use as food or feed, or for 
processing under Article 11. 
98
 Thee information are similar to those required in Annex I for LMOs destined for deliberate release in to 
the environment, but are not so extensive. 
99
 Mackenzie R, op cit n3 at 87. 
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access to this information.100  Under Article 8(2) of the Protocol, Parties are required 
to ensure that under their domestic law there is a requirement for accuracy of 
information provided in relation to the LMO-FFP.  Under Article 11 (3) any Party 
may request additional information from the authority identified in paragraph (b) of 
Annex II.  
 
2.5.2. Domestic regulatory frameworks regarding import decisions 
Article 11(4) asserts the right of Parties to require prior approval of imports of LMO-
FFPs by referring to national decisions on imports.  Thus, although LMO-FFPs are 
outside the scope of application of the Protocol’s AIA procedure, in their domestic 
regulatory framework Parties may still choose to require advance notification and 
approval of a proposed transboundary movement of a LMO-FFP.  In addition, the 
domestic regulatory framework must be consistent with the objective of the Protocol. 
However Article 11 (4) does not contain an obligation, but merely asserts a parties’ 
right to make a decision for import of LMO-FFPs under its domestic regulatory 
frame work that is consistent with the objectives of the protocol.  Furthermore, 
beyond consistency with the objective of the Protocol, Article 11 does not specify any 
particular procedural requirements to be reflected in domestic regulatory 
frameworks applicable to imports of LMO-FFPs.101  
 
Article 11(5) of the Protocol is intended to promote transparency and 
predictability, by requiring Parties to notify through the BCH relevant national 
frameworks that they will apply to imports of LMO-FFPs.  It requires parties to 
make such decisions, laws and regulations available to the BCH. However the 
Protocol does not specify in which language or format the information on relevant 
national regulations is to be made available. 
                                                 
100
 In practice, however, in some instances the domestic requirements of the importing Party may result in 
first imports of a LMO-FFP being subject to procedures similar to AIA. The importing country may well 
require prior notification of a first import of a LMO-FFP, as well as a risk assessment, and explicit 
approval. 
101
 Of course, a Party may also be subject to other relevant international obligations, including those under 
the WTO Agreements. 
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Article 11(6) addresses the specific needs of developing countries or countries 
that have economies in transition including Uganda which do not yet have in place a 
domestic regulatory framework addressing imports of LMO-FFPs could nonetheless 
subject such imports to prior notification and approval procedures in a manner 
consistent with the Protocol’s objective.  Any such Party which does not have a 
domestic regulatory framework for LMO-FFP imports in place, but which wishes to 
subject such imports to prior assessment and approval, should indicate this to the 
Biosafety Clearing-House,102 on which information has to be provided under Article 
11 (1), and will be taken according to a risk assessment in accordance with Annex III 
and a decision made within predictable time frame not exceeding 270 days.103   
 
If one compares the procedure for LMO-FFPs under Article 11 to that of 
LMOs destined for intentional introduction into the environment under the AIA 
procedure, two main differences can be observed.  Firstly, while the Protocol itself 
mandates a specific procedure to be followed for LMOs of the latter category (the 
AIA procedure), it does not do the same for LMO-FFPs, but only offers developing 
countries the possibility to declare a specific procedure as applicable under the 
Protocol. So the importing party has to trigger off the procedure by a specific 
declaration and, thus, carries the relevant burden.  Secondly, while the AIA 
procedure provides for the requirement of consent before a transaction can take 
place, under Article 11 (6), exports may also take place without explicit consent of 
the importing country.   
 
In summary, it can easily be noticed that the procedural protection which is 
offered especially to developing countries by Article 11 is far lower than that 
                                                 
102
 For practical purposes, a Party making such a declaration should also indicate the national authority to 
which notification of any proposed import should be made and this will be the competent national authority 
of the importing Party under Article 19 (or one of them). 
103
 Annex III provides details on risk assessment required under Article 15 of the protocol. 
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presented by the AIA procedure.104  Lastly, Article 11 (8) explicitly allows the parties 
to take a precautionary approach to decision-making on imports. In addition, the 
general rules concerning risk management and socio-economic considerations are 
also applicable. 
 
 3.0. Handling, transport, packaging and identification 
Article 18 addresses the handling, transport, packaging and identification of LMOs 
and has two main functions.  First, is to ensure that LMOs are handled and moved 
safely to avoid adverse effects on biodiversity and human health. Second, is to 
provide information to those handling LMOs and to the Party of import.  Article 
18(1) imposes a general obligation on each Party to the Protocol to require safe 
handling, packaging and transport of LMOs subject to transboundary movement.105 
This provision is linked to more general obligations upon Parties to the Protocol and 
to the CBD to regulate, manage and control risks associated with LMOs.106  A 
number of countries have in place rules and standards that are relevant to ensuring 
safe handling, packaging and transport of LMOs.   
 
Article 18(2) requires Parties to take measures to ensure that LMOs subject to 
intentional transboundary movement are accompanied by documentation.  This 
documentation should identify the LMOs and provide contact details of the 
individuals and institutions responsible for the movement of the LMOs.  The 
documentation requirements in Article 18(2) are a means of identifying and tracking 
the transboundary movement of LMOs.107  However, Article 18(2) does not specify 
the language of documentation accompanying LMOs and it also provides vague 
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 Alexander Behrens, op cit n84 at 60. 
105
 Article 18 (1) states that, in order to avoid adverse effects on the conservation and sustainable use of 
biological diversity, taking also into account risks to human health, each Party shall take necessary 
measures to require that living modified organisms that are subject to intentional transboundary movement 
within the scope of this Protocol are handled, packaged and transported under conditions of safety, taking 
into consideration relevant international rules and standards. 
106Article 8(g) CBD; and Article 16 of the Protocol 
107
 They are a key element in ensuring that Parties of import know when they are receiving a transboundary 
movement of LMOs, whether for import or in transit and in the event of accidental releases during 
transport, documentation can provide information that might assist efforts to reduce risk of damage. 
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identification requirements. Article 18(2) (a) addresses the documentation 
requirements for LMO-FFPs.  Article 18(2)(b) sets out the basic requirements for 
documentation accompanying LMOs destined for contained use.  
 
Lastly, Article 18 (3) states that the Conference of the Parties (COP) shall 
consider the need for, and modalities of developing standards with regard to 
identification, handling, transport and packaging.  The Intergovernmental 
Committee on the Cartagena Protocol (ICCP) has initiated preparatory consideration 
of this issue.  The vagueness of Article 18(1) and (2) illustrates that the parties could 
not arrive at greater compromise during negotiations. Instead, they postponed 
further measures to the COP.108 
 
4.0. Risk Assessment and Management 
The objective of risk assessment under the Protocol is, to identify and evaluate the 
possible adverse effects of LMOs on the conservation and sustainable use of 
biodiversity, taking also into account risks to human health.  Key elements of 
effective risk management include monitoring systems, research programmes, 
technical training and improved domestic coordination amongst government 
agencies and services. The actual process of deciding as such can be characterized as 
weighing of policy alternatives in light of considering the risk assessment and 
possibly other factors.109 
 
4.1. Risk Assessment 
Article 15 establishes the basic requirements for risk assessment under the Protocol, 
and refers to Annex III for further guidance.  Article 15 and Annex III are, therefore, 
closely connected.  The Protocol requires that decisions regarding the import of 
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 Goldman Karen, ‘Labeling of Genetically Modified Foods: Legal and Scientific issues’, Georgetown 
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 Note however, that the Protocol does not contain a definition for risk assessment nor risk management. 
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Foods” of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, available at 
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LMOs for intentional introduction into the environment to be taken in accordance 
with a risk assessment.  
 
Article 15(1) provides that risk assessments must be carried out in a 
scientifically sound manner and must be aimed at evaluating the possible adverse 
effects of LMOs.110  There is no definition of the phrase “scientifically sound 
manner” in the Protocol. Indeed, there appears to be no internationally agreed 
definition of the phrase “scientifically sound”.111  Furthermore, the Protocol does not 
explain the term “possible adverse effects”.  The possible adverse effects of LMOs 
that are to be identified and evaluated are those that might affect the conservation 
and sustainable use of biological diversity, taking also into account risks to human 
health.112   
 
Article 15(2) places an obligation on Parties of import to ensure that risk 
assessments are the basis for reaching decisions on proposed imports of LMOs that 
are subject to the Protocol’s AIA procedure.  The Party of import may perform the 
risk assessment, or alternatively, the Party of import may require the exporter to 
carry out the risk assessment.  In some countries, national authorities perform a risk 
assessment, on the basis of information provided by the applicant/ notifier. 
 
Annex III specifies the modalities of risk assessment. Accordingly risks 
associated with LMOs should be considered in the context of the risks posed by non-
modified recipients.  Annex III, further, sets out the methodology for the risk 
assessment as well as the aspects that have to be taken into account.  Thus, Annex III 
does not only point to the requirement of scientific soundness, but also provides a 
point of reference for the risk management technique. 
 
                                                 
110
 This risk assessment must be in accordance with Annex III. 
111
 Mackenzie R, op cit n3 at 108. 
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In the context of risk assessment, one important and hotly debated question 
during the negotiations was what kind of adverse effects should be taken into 
account.  Should the assessment be limited to adverse effects on the biological 
diversity or should those on human health also be considered.  In South Africa and 
Uganda, risk assessment is done by way of Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
but because of hindrances such as corruption and under funding, at times the 
objectives and the effectiveness of the EIA procedure is undermined.  To make 
matters worse, the provision that the notifier bares the costs greatly compromises the 
whole process as chances are next to none that in such instances the assessment shall 
be neutral. 
 
In a nut shell, the Protocol empowers governments to decide whether or not 
to accept imports of GMOs on the basis of risk assessments. While the country 
considering permitting the import of a GMO is responsible for ensuring that a risk 
assessment is carried out, it has the right to require the exporter to do the work or to 
bear the cost. This is particularly important for many developing countries including 
South Africa and Uganda. 
 
4.2. Risk Management 
No technology or human activity is completely risk-free. People accept new 
technologies because they believe the potential benefits outweigh the potential risks.  
The Protocol requires each country to manage and control any risks that may be 
identified by a risk assessment.113  Article 16(1) deals with the management of risks 
posed by those organisms that fall within the Scope of the Protocol (i.e. all LMOs 
covered by Article 4) and refer to the provisions of Article 8(g) of the CBD.  Article 
16(1) places an obligation on Parties to set up appropriate mechanisms, measures 
and strategies to regulate, manage and control risks identified in the risk assessment 
provisions of the Protocol.  However, the Protocol does not give any specific 
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guidance on how suitable risk management strategies may be identified.  In order to 
manage risk, risk management strategies need to be effective when applied in 
practice by those who will have the responsibility for implementing them.114 
 
Article 16(2) refers to the measures to regulate, manage and control those 
risks that are identified through the risk assessment provisions of the Protocol, as 
described in Article 15(1) and 16(1).  However, the Protocol does not 
comprehensively regulate the risk management process, but it deals with three 
related issues in this context.  These include: scientific uncertainty, socio-economic 
considerations and necessity.  The precautionary principle remains within the 
overall context of the decision-making according to scientific criteria.  Most 
developing countries including South Africa and Uganda do not have efficient 
regulatory systems and agencies to carry out risk management and this frustrates 
the whole process.  
 
Thus the Protocol therefore, requires each Party to notify and consult other 
affected or potentially affected governments when it becomes aware that GMOs 
under its jurisdiction may cross international borders due to illegal trade or release 
into the environment. This will enable the Parties to pursue emergency measures or 
other appropriate action. Governments must establish official contact points for 
emergencies as a way of improving international coordination. 
 
5.0. Public awareness and participation 
It is clearly important that individual citizens understand and are involved in 
national decisions on GMOs.  The Protocol therefore calls for cooperation on 
promoting public awareness of the safe transfer, handling and use of GMOs.  Public 
awareness and participation is dealt with by Article23 of the Protocol. Parties may 
on a discretionary or mandatory basis undertake to provide information on LMOs to 
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the public,115 include public participation in LMO-related decision-making 
processes,116 and provision of information to the public about access to the BCH.117   
 
Article 23(1) does not explicitly require Parties to make specific information 
available to the public.  The obligation is somewhat softer. Parties are required to 
“promote and facilitate” public awareness, education and awareness regarding 
LMOs, and are to “endeavour” to ensure public awareness and education on LMOs 
that may be imported.  Article 23(2) of the Protocol lays down affirmative 
obligations on Parties to consult the public in the decision-making process regarding 
LMOs and make the results of such decisions available to the public.  The obligation 
to consult the public applies generally to all decision-making processes regarding 
LMOs, including the making of decisions on imports of LMOs.   
 
However, Article 23(2) does not provide specific guidance on the public 
consultation mechanisms to be adopted in decision-making processes and on how to 
make results of decisions on LMOs available to the public.  This effectively leaves it 
up to the Parties to decide how this obligation should be implemented in their own 
national contexts.  Under Article 23(3) each Party “shall endeavour” to inform its 
public about the means of public access to the BCH.  Article 23(3) of the Protocol 
requires Parties to take steps to inform the public about the means of access to 
information contained in the Biosafety Clearing-House. However, the phrase “shall 
endeavour” in Article 23(3) appears not to create an obligation on the Parties to 
inform the public about the means of information of access. 
 
Thus the Protocol therefore, calls for cooperation on promoting public 
awareness of the safe transfer, handling and use of GMOs. It specifically highlights 
the need for education, which will increasingly have to address GMOs as 
biotechnology becomes more and more a part of our lives.  The Protocol also calls for 
                                                 
115
 Article 23(1). 
116
 Article 23(2). 
117
 (Article 23(3)). 
  
 
36 
the public to be actively consulted on GMOs and biosafety. Individuals, 
communities and non-governmental organizations should remain fully engaged in 
this complex issue. This will enable people to contribute to the final decisions taken 
by governments, thus promoting transparency and informed decision-making. 
However, in many countries especially the developing countries the right of public 
participation and awareness is included in their biosafety legislation but it is 
hindered by many factors such as financial constraints, Language barriers and high 
illiteracy levels where by the local population does not even know that such a right 
exists and they are entitled to it.  
 
6.0. Socio-economic Considerations 
Under Article 26 of the protocol, in making import decisions, parties can take into 
account socio-economic considerations arising from the import of LMOs on the 
conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity, especially with regard to the value 
of biological diversity to indigenous and local communities.  Article 26 addresses the 
extent to which Parties are entitled to take socio-economic considerations into 
account in reaching decisions on imports of LMOs. Article 26 identifies the types of 
socio-economic considerations that Parties may take into account in reaching 
decisions on imports.118  Article 26 of the Protocol requires that such considerations 
be taken into account consistent with a Party’s other international obligations (for 
example, under international agreements other than the Protocol).  Finally, it 
encourages Parties to cooperate on research and information exchange on the 
potential socio-economic impacts of LMOs.119 
 
The range of socio-economic considerations contemplated in Article 26(1) of 
the Protocol covers only those “considerations arising from the impact of LMOs on 
the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, especially with regard to 
the value of biological diversity to indigenous and local communities”.  This 
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wording clearly indicates that not all socio-economic considerations may be taken 
into account, but rather only those that arise from the impact of LMOs on biological 
diversity.120 
 
7.0. Supportive Measures 
The preamble of the Cartagena Protocol acknowledges the need to take into account 
the limited capacities of some Parties especially the developing countries, “to cope 
with the nature and scale of known and potential risks associated with LMOs”.121  
The Protocol provides for measures aimed at mainly building the capacity of 
developing countries and economies in transition, in implementing the Protocol; 122  
ensuring that import decisions are within the context of the AIA procedure;123 the 
Information Sharing and Biosafety Clearing-House (BCH) mechanism;124 and a 
system of financial resources to facilitate its implementation for developing 
countries.125  
 
The supportive measures of the Protocol have to some extent generally 
addressed the needs of the developing countries including South Africa and 
Uganda.  For example the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) which is the financial 
mechanism for the Protocol provides funds to ensure that at least a certain level of 
financial resources is available to developing countries.  In addition, the ICCP in its 
second meeting endorsed the “Action Plan for Building Capacities for the Effective 
Implementation of the Cartagena Protocol”, with a view to facilitate and support the 
development of capacity to effectively implement the Protocol.126  But there are still 
some inadequacies that have to be addressed before developing countries can fully 
benefit from the supportive measures, in particular, it will be noted that many of the 
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provisions that contain supportive measures contain no specific commitments and 
are couched in soft terms, and framed as mere obligations to co-operate.  
 
8.0. Institutional Framework and Enforcement Aspects 
The Cartagena Protocol has various institutions and enforcement aspects that are 
meant to implement the Protocol and also ensure compliance as per Article 34 of the 
Protocol.  First, the Protocol establishes the Conference of the Parties (COP) which it 
shares with the CBD and it serves as the Conference of the Parties to the Protocol 
(COP-MOP).127  The COP has the powers to make decisions that are necessary to 
promote effective implementation of the Protocol and is also charged with 
undertaking further work on the issues that were left unresolved by the Protocol.  
Secondly, the Protocol establishes subsidiary bodies of the CBD in relation to the 
Protocol.128  Under Article 30 of the Protocol, the subsidiary bodies may be asked to 
provide scientific, technical, or technological advice to the COP/MOP of the 
Protocol.   
 
At present there is only one standing subsidiary body established by the CBD.  This 
is the Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical and Technological Advice, established 
under Article 25 of the CBD.  Thirdly, the Protocol provides for the Secretariat that is 
established by Article 24 of the CBD.129 One of the main functions of the Secretariat is 
to administer the Protocol and to act as day-today contact point for the Protocol for 
Parties, international organizations and others.  The Secretariat also prepares 
documentation for meetings of the governing and subsidiary bodies of the Protocol, 
and is also in charge of organizing and servicing the meetings. The Secretariat also 
plays an important role in the functioning of the Biosafety Clearing-House (BCH). 
Furthermore, the COP/MOP may assign additional specific functions and tasks to 
the Secretariat. 
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The Protocol also has various enforcement aspects that are meant to ensure 
compliance with the Protocol.  Firstly, the Protocol relies on the national system for 
its enforcement by providing for national legislation to panelize transboundary 
movements in contravention of domestic measures implementing the Protocol.130  
Secondly, the Protocol sets up a monitoring mechanism where the Parties are to 
individually monitor the implementation of the Protocol, and report from time to 
time to the Conference of the Parties on “measures taken to implement the 
Protocol”.131  Lastly, the Protocol requires that each Party shall designate one 
national focal point and one or more competent national authorities that shall be 
responsible for performing the administrative functions required by the Protocol.132   
 
Enforcement provisions of the Protocol are necessary for the effectiveness of 
the Protocol since most of the provisions are couched in soft terms and the 
obligations are too general and not self-executing.  This suggests that the Parties 
have to enact substantive domestic legislation and also put in place effective 
monitoring systems. There is also some kind of duplication of provisions by the 
Protocol as some are already provided for by the CBD. 
 
9.0. The Unresolved issues 
The Cartagena negotiations were not able to address all the key unresolved issues 
that had not been conclusively agreed upon by the Parties by the end of the 
negotiations. These key unresolved issues included: Liability and redress; socio-
economic considerations; property rights; reconciliation with the WTO rules; and the 
precautionary principle. As a result some key issues were not and still remain 
unresolved but were left at the discretion of individual states and others have been 
gradually addressed by the subsequent COP-MOPs.133 
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D. Conclusion 
The Cartagena Protocol can only ensure that the global use of biotechnology is safe if 
each and every country actively promotes biosafety at the national level. National 
policymakers and legislators have a vital role to play in establishing and 
strengthening laws and standards for reducing the potential risks of GMOs. Under 
the Protocol, it is governments that are ultimately responsible for preventing illegal 
shipments and accidental releases, managing any risks or emergencies and 
regulating national biotech industries.  From an environmental point of view, one of 
the highlights of the Protocol is the precautionary principle. Because modern 
biotechnology is such a revolutionary science, and has spawned such a powerful 
industry, it has great potential to reshape the world around us. It is already 
changing agriculture and the food we eat.   
 
Given the complexities and the high stakes, it is reassuring that the global 
community has already agreed on a regulatory safeguard at this early stage in the 
development of modern biotechnology.  There can be no doubt that biosafety will 
remain at the top of the international environmental agenda for many years to come. 
A comparative analysis on implementation of the Protocol in South Africa and 
Uganda follows in the next chapter. 
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                                               CHAPTER THREE: 
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE DOMESTIC IMPLEMENTATION 
OF THE CARTAGENA PROTOCOL IN SOUTH AFRICA AND UGANDA 
 
A. Introduction 
 National biosafety frameworks and regulatory regimes are a combination of policy, 
legal, administrative and technical instruments that have been developed to address 
safety for the environment and human health in the context of developing and 
applying modern biotechnology with focus on genetically modified organisms. 
South Africa and Uganda have varying biosafety regulatory frameworks but they 
contain a number of common components.   
 
This chapter initially gives an overview of selected key features of the 
biosafety regulatory framework in South Africa and Uganda.  This chapter later 
makes a comparative analysis of the biosafety legislation of South Africa on the one 
hand, and the interim biosafety regulatory regime of Uganda on the other hand with 
reference to related provisions of the Protocol.  This comparison was be done by 
examining selected key main features of the Genetically Modified Organisms (GMO) 
Act,134 Genetically Modified Organisms (GMO) Regulations,135 and the more 
recently adopted Genetically Modified Organisms (GMO) Amendment Act,136 in 
South Africa on one hand, and the Draft National Biotechnology and Biosafety 
Policy,137 and the Draft Biosafety Regulations in Uganda,138 on the other hand. 
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1.0. Background  
1.1. South Africa 
The regulatory process of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in South Africa 
dates back as far as the late 1980’s when there was no biosafety law in place.  At that 
time the 1983 Agricultural Pests Act regulated the research and testing of transgenics 
and the South African Committee for Genetic Experimentation (SAGENE) served as 
the scientific advisory body on environmental releases of GMOs.139  The first release 
of transgenics occurred in 1997.140  The GMO Act was passed in 1997 but became 
operational in 1999 and the government also adopted the GMO regulations to 
address the other issues not mentioned in the GMO Act.141  Recently the GMO 
Amendment Act was adopted in April 2007. The Department of Agriculture (DOA) 
administers the GMO Act and it establishes procedures and institutional structures 
that regulate GMOs in South Africa. Currently, South Africa is the only country on 
the African continent that grows transgenic crops commercially.142 
 
1.2. Uganda 
Over the years Uganda has taken significant steps to ensure safety in modern 
biotechnology applications.  Currently Uganda’s interim biosafety regulatory regime 
consists of the Draft National Biotechnology and Biosafety Policy,143 and the Draft 
Biosafety Regulations.144  Uganda signed the Cartagena Protocol on biosafety at the 
Conference of the Parties (COP) in Nairobi in May 2000 and ratified it in 2001. As a 
party to the Protocol, Uganda is obliged to properly and effectively implement the 
Protocol.  The Uganda National Council for Science and Technology (UNCST) 
developed the interim Biosafety regulatory regime in Uganda and it defines the 
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scope with in which institutions engaged in biotechnology may operate.145  The 
interim biosafety framework in Uganda is coordinated by the UNCST.  Currently 
Uganda has a Biosafety Bill that was published in 2005 but it has not yet been 
enacted into law.  For purposes of this study the Biosafety Bill of 2005 of Uganda 
shall not be considered since it is not yet operational.  
 
B.  A Comparative Analysis of Selected Key Provisions 
This section of the study makes a comparative analysis of selected key features of the 
biosafety regulatory systems of South Africa and Uganda with reference to related 
provisions of the Cartagena Protocol.  These include: 
 
1.0. Objective 
The objective of a biosafety regulatory regime specifies the purpose and intention of 
parties. 
1.1. South Africa  
The GMO Act and the GMO Amendment Act do not a have clearly stated objective 
but the preamble to the GMO Act subsumes the need for biosafety into the 
imperative to promote genetically modified organisms.  In this regard, the preamble 
provides for ‘measures to promote the responsible development, production, use 
and application of genetically modified organisms’.  It may therefore be presumed 
that the objective of the Act is there fore the promotion of the technology that it aims 
to regulate.  It would perhaps have been more appropriate to state that that the 
objective of the Act is to provide for a comprehensive regulation of genetically 
modified organisms in order to ensure that the environment, and human and animal 
health, is not harmed.146 
 
The objective of the South Africa GMO Act stands in stark contrast with the 
approach taken in countries like the United Kingdom.  The United Kingdom 
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Environmental Protection Act of 1990 declares that the essential purpose of control 
of GMOs is to prevent or minimize ant damage to the environment that could arise 
as result of their escape or release from human control.147 
 
1.2. Uganda 
The Draft Biosafety Regulations do not have any provision specifically outlining 
their objective.  But these Draft Regulations aim at providing a legal basis for the 
eventual implementation of a National biosafety system consistent with the 
provisions of the Convention of Biological Diversity (CBD) and the Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety by ensuring the protection of the environment, including 
humans, in the use of GMOs.  The Draft National Biotechnology and Biosafety 
Policy states that “the objective of a biosafety regulatory system is to review and 
offer guidance and to monitor and evaluate biotechnology applications”.148  This 
statement merely looks like a general definition targeted at no specific biosafety 
regulatory system and mainly lays emphasis on guiding, monitoring and evaluating 
applications. 
 
1.3. Precautionary Principle 
The precautionary principle represents an important tool for decision-making, 
which has arguably crystallized into customary international, law.149  The 
precautionary principle is also internationally accepted and it is also enshrined in the 
in the Rio Declaration on Development and the Environment and it postulates that, 
in cases when serious harm is threatened, positive action to protect the environment 
should not be delayed until irrefutable scientific proof of harm is available.150  The 
precautionary approach is particularly important when dealing with the issues that 
are presented by GMOs.  This is especially so, where the novelty of modern 
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biotechnology and the incredible complexity of the living systems of our planet, 
make it impossible to predict the consequences of the release of GMOs into the 
environment with any degree of certainty.151 
 
1.3.1. South Africa 
Unfortunately the GMO Act and the GMO Amendment Act of South Africa do not 
make any mention of the precautionary principle or approach yet the Protocol has 
precautionary approach as one of its central provisions.152 The GMO Act has, rather 
effectively rendered the application of the precautionary principle ineffective by 
including the following provision that ‘lack of scientific knowledge or consensus on 
the safe use of GMOs shall not be interpreted as indicating a particular level of risk, 
an acceptable risk or an absence of risk’.153  Thus, the lack of scientific knowledge or 
consensus on the safe use of GMOs is not relevant, or should not be taken into 
account when dealing with GMOs.  This is directly contrary to the spirit of the 
precautionary principle, which was intended to establish a bias in favour of the 
environment in situations of scientific uncertainty.154 
 
The absence of provisions relating to the precautionary approach in the GMO 
Amendment Act, further illustrates that the government has failed to recognize its 
importance in protecting the environment given the uncertainty of risks that are 
associated with GMOs and biotechnology. As a consequence the GMO Act and the 
GMO Amendment Act in their present form are inconsistent with the Protocol. 
 
The failure by the GMO Act of South Africa to implement the precautionary 
principle is a violation of Article 24 of the Constitution.  Section 24 of the 
Constitution obliges the state to protect future generations and this may require the 
state to take precautions when the possible risks of science are uncertain. 
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1.3.2. Uganda 
The preamble of the Draft National Biotechnology and Biosafety Policy provides for 
consistence with the ‘precautionary principle’ when dealing with the potential risks 
of genetic modifications in addressing the risks of GMOs.  The preamble of the Draft 
National Biotechnology and Biosafety Policy takes cognizance of the precautionary 
principle though it does not specifically provide for a precautionary approach as 
stated in Article 1 of the Protocol.  The precautionary principle rests on the need to 
recognize that harm to the environment can be irreversible and therefore “it is better 
to avoid any possible harm to the environment than to try and remedy it later”.155 
 
The adoption of the precautionary principle by the Draft National 
Biotechnology and Biosafety Policy in Uganda strongly suggests that Uganda has 
adopted a stricter view of protecting the environment from the dangers that are 
posed by GMOs exceeding the minimum criterion that is set out by the Protocol.  In 
the Case of Jane Lugolobi and 9 Others v Gerald Segirinya t/a Smart Curry Powder,156 the 
applicants sought an injunction against the applicant who was manufacturing curry 
powder in a residential area.  The court stated that the precautionary principle has to 
be taken into account since it had not yet been determined what effects the dust and 
the noise from the machines that manufactured the curry powder had on human 
health and the environment. 
 
1.4. Comparative Analysis 
The objective of the protocol under Article 1 is to contribute to ensuring an adequate 
level of protection in the field of the safe transfer, handling and use of living 
modified organisms resulting from the use of modern biotechnology that may have 
adverse effects on the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, 
taking also into account risks to human health, and specifically focusing on 
transboundary movement and all this is in accordance with the precautionary 
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approach contained in principle 15 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development.  
 
The Draft Biosafety Regulations of Uganda do not fully comply with the 
Protocol. This is because they do not have any clearly outlined objectives.  
Furthermore, instead of ‘conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, 
also taking into account risks to human health’, the Regulations use ‘protection of 
the environment including humans’.  The draft biosafety regulations do not provide 
for specific application of the precautionary principle though the preamble of the 
Draft National Biotechnology and Biosafety Policy provides for consistency with the 
precautionary principle when dealing with the potential risks associated with 
genetic modifications.  The draft regulations should be rectified to specifically 
provide for the precautionary approach so as to fully comply with the protocol.  The 
Draft Biosafety Regulations also make no reference to ‘specifically focusing on 
transboundary movement of LMOs’. 
 
The GMO Act of South Africa totally ignores the precautionary principle and 
the GMO Amendment Act has not made any attempts to remedy the situation.  The 
GMO Act and the GMO Amendment Act provide for risk assessments based on 
scientific evidence at the expense of the precautionary approach.  It is suggested that 
the GMO Act and the GMO Amendment Act do not comply with Article 1 of the 
Protocol since scientific evidence cannot be conclusively relied upon as it is also 
prone to error and inaccuracy. 
 
It is apparent that the Draft Biosafety Regulations of Uganda and the GMO 
Act and the GMO Amendment Act of South Africa do not comply with the Protocol 
because they do not have clearly outlined objectives that comply with the Protocol. 
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2.0. Scope 
The scope provides parameters within which a biosafety regulatory system 
functions by identifying aspects that are covered and excluded by the biosafety 
regulatory system.  
 
2.1. South Africa 
The GMO Act states that the Act shall apply to:  
1. The genetic modification of organisms;157  
2. The development, production, release, use and application of genetically 
modified organisms;158 and  
3. To the use of gene therapy.159  
 
Unlike the Cartagena Protocol as discussed in (1.0 of part C in Chapter 2), the 
GMO Act only makes reference to GMOs and not living modified organisms 
(LMOs).  This creates the impression that the GMO Act has a very wide and general 
scope of application.  The Protocol is concerned with the “transboundary movement, 
transit, handling and use” of GMOs that may have adverse effects on biological 
diversity, “taking also into account human health”.  The GMO Act makes no 
mention of any of the above provisions of the Protocol.  Though the GMO 
Amendment Act has been adopted, it has not done much to remedy the situation nor 
has it amended section 2 of the principal Act.  
 
The GMO Act of South Africa is limited in Scope as it only applies to viable 
living GMOs and not products of GMOs.  Furthermore, Section 1 of the GMO Act 
appears to absolve developers of GMOs from liability and shifts liability to users of 
GMOs. Such a provision amounts to overprotection of the biotechnology industry. 
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2.2. Uganda 
The goal of Uganda’s interim biosafety regulatory regime is to comprehensively 
address all potential risks that are associated with GMOs.  The Draft Biosafety 
regulations of Uganda apply to the generation, import, export, contained use, release 
or placing on the market or of any GMO or their living products.160  Exempted from 
the Scope of the Draft Regulations are GMOs that are pharmaceuticals for humans, 
GMOs that have been determined by the competent authority as not having any 
adverse effects on human health and the environment, and the contained use, 
deliberate release and placing on the market of GMOs that have been authorized by 
the competent authority for placing on the market. Therefore, Uganda’s interim 
biosafety regulatory regime has the ability to addresses the full range of potential 
environmental issues that might arise from any type of activity involving a GMO.  
 
Uganda’s interim biosafety regulatory regime only requires approval for each 
particular GMO at each stage of development and does not require a pre-market 
safety approval for each individual product derived from GMOs.161  Instead, the 
food safety and environmental risks assessments for the particular GMO includes an 
analysis of the different products that might be produced from GMOs and whether 
those products may pose any environmental or food safety risks.162  Although 
Uganda’s biosafety regulatory regime addresses environmental issues, it has not yet 
set forth how it will assess any potential food safety risks that might arise from some 
GMOs.  
 
In addition, the draft regulations do not distinguish GMOs based on the 
products that they produce or their intended purpose.  Although there is a small 
likelihood that eating a particular genetically modified organism will have a harmful 
health effect. Biosafety regulatory systems should analyze all potential risks to 
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humans, including food safety issues.163  The interim biosafety regulatory regime of 
Uganda states that potential risks to human health are to be addressed through a 
comprehensive biosafety regulatory system by stating that biosafety is defined to 
include risks posed to human health.164  However, the scope of the interim biosafety 
regulatory regime of Uganda does not cover the other products derived from GMOs. 
 
2.3. Comparative Analysis 
The Cartagena Protocol provides for circumstances in which a Party must apply the 
provisions of the Protocol.  The Protocol under Article 4 provides that the provisions 
of the Protocol shall apply to the transboundary movement, transit, handling and 
use of all LMOs that may have adverse effects on conservation and sustainable use 
of biological diversity, taking also into account risks to human health.  From the 
above explanation, one may get the impression that the Protocol only applies to 
living modified organisms (LMOs).  The Draft Biosafety Regulations of Uganda 
apply to the generation, import, and export, contained use, release or placing on the 
market of any GMO or their living products.165  On the other hand, the GMO Act 
applies to the genetic modification of organisms; the development, production, 
release, use and application of GMOs (including viruses and bacteriophages); and 
the use of gene therapy.  
 
The above provisions suggest that the GMO Act only applies to GMOs and 
not LMOs and the Draft Biosafety Regulations of Uganda apply to GMOs and their 
living products.  The GMO Act is also silent about the transboundary movement of 
LMOs and only refers to the production and release of GMOs.  On the other hand, 
Draft Biosafety Regulations of Uganda apply to the import and export of GMOs and 
there living products, though there is no specific reference to the phrase 
‘transboundary movement’. 
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The biosafety legislation of South Africa and the interim biosafety regulatory 
regime of Uganda do not have the wording specifically stating that their Scope ‘shall 
apply to LMOs that may have adverse effects on conservation and sustainable use of 
biological diversity, taking also into account risks to human health’.  Both biosafety 
regulatory systems are silent with regard to conservation and sustainable use of 
biological diversity and taking into account of risks to human health.  However, the 
Draft Biosafety Regulations of Uganda state that GMOs that have been determined 
by the competent authority as not having any adverse effects on human health and 
the environment shall be exempted from the scope of the Cartagena Protocol. 
 
It is suggested that, though the Draft Biosafety Regulations attempt to 
comply with the provisions of the Protocol, both the biosafety regulatory systems of 
Uganda and South Africa do not fully comply with the protocol.  The Draft Biosafety 
Regulations of Uganda do not distinguish GMOs based on their products or their 
intended purpose and they also do not state how they will assess any potential food 
safety risks that might arise from some GMOs.  The provisions in the GMO Act 
regarding the scope of its application are inadequate and unworkable to effectively 
serve the purposes and objectives of the Cartagena Protocol. 
 
3.0. Institutional Framework and key Regulatory provisions 
Institutional frameworks and regulatory provisions are important in the supervision, 
enforcement and administration of biosafety regulatory system as this ensures 
compliance. 
 
3.1. South Africa 
The GMO Amendment Act establishes, as the key administrative and regulatory 
authority, a juristic person known as the Executive Council of GMOs(‘the 
Council’),166 which consists of not more than ten members appointed by the 
Minister, eight of whom are required to be officers from eight national government 
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departments having an interest in GMOs.167 Under the GMO Amendment Act the 
objectives of the Council are: 
…to advise the minister on all aspects concerning activities relating to genetically modified 
organisms, and ensure that such activities are performed in accordance with this Act.168 
 
The GMO Act sets out the powers of the Council and it’s the key decision-
making body for the granting of permits, and takes trade and socio-economic issues 
into account when making decisions.169  The council was welcomed and viewed as 
an independent body that would make decisions that were previously in the hands 
of the Department of Agriculture.170  However, it is overoptimistic to view the 
council as an independent body, yet it consists of government officials that have 
historically had to deal with environmental decision-making, as they cannot be 
relied upon to robustly safeguard and promote community interests.171  Essentially, 
civil society representation on the council is indispensable.   
 
Secondly, the Act establishes an Advisory Committee (‘the Committee’) with 
which the Executive Council is obliged to consult with before granting approvals.172  
The Advisory Committee consists of ten members, eight of whom are required to 
have relevant scientific knowledge concerning GMOs.173  Two of the members shall 
be from the public sector of which one person shall have knowledge of ecological 
matters and GMOs.174  Glazewski defines the word “public sector” as superfluous 
and suggests that it should simply be read “public”.175  The Committee is essentially 
an advisory body that bases its decisions on scientific data.  Section 11 of the GMO 
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Act sets out in detail the functions of the committee.  Generally, these are to advise 
the minister, the council and appropriate bodies on matters concerning genetic 
modification and to carry out related functions.176  The Committee replaced the 
SAGENE, which previously carried out this work.  Mayet cautions that the 
requirement that the majority of the members emanate from the scientific 
community could hamper a full and thorough assessment of the implications of the 
introduction of GMOs into the environment.177  This is because GMOs interact with 
the environment in a complex way, requiring a multi-disciplinary approach in order 
to assess the potential risks.178 
  
Furthermore, the inclusion of the phrase ‘public sector’ is somewhat puzzling. 
Since the government is fully represented on the council it is questionable why an 
advisory committee should require further government representation.  Of more 
concern, however, is the question of why civil society participation has been 
excluded.179 Mayet believes that this is inconsistent with the tenets upon which 
South Africa’s democracy is built, and with the principle of public participation in 
environmental governance advocated by Government policy. 180  
 
Thirdly, the Act establishes a Registrar that is appointed by the Minister in 
consultation with the Council and is charged with the administration of the GMO 
Act.  The Registrar is empowered to exercise such powers and perform such duties 
as may be conferred upon or delegated or assigned to him/her under the Act or by 
the Council and this includes the issue of permits and other related functions.181  The 
Registrar may, at his/her own discretion, “fast track” any application for an activity 
involving GMOs for which a permit had previously been granted.182   
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It is suggested that the structure of the institutional frameworks in South Africa 
creates room for conflicts due to overlaps in such authorities’ jurisdictions. An 
illustration of this is the inherent conflict between South Africa’s section 78(1) of the 
Biodiversity Act and the GMO Act.  The said section of the Biodiversity Act provides 
that no permit for release of GMO should be issued in circumstances where the 
Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism believes that it may pose a threat to 
the environment or any indigenous species unless a prior Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA) has been conducted.  The Minister is expected, under section 
78(2), to convey such belief to the authority that is charged with the responsibility of 
issuing permits under the GMO Act.  The lacuna in this regard is that there is no 
provision in the GMO Act, which requires the Minister to be notified before 
applications for release are granted under the GMO Act.  Interestingly, there are 
many issues that regulatory authorities have to contend with.  These are: the 
complexity of biotechnology, fiscal restraints and globalisation.  The institutional 
framework under the GMO Act of South Africa described above is summarized and 
set forth in illustration 1 below. 
 
Illustration 1: The institutional framework under the GMO Act of South Africa 
 
                     Department of Agriculture (NFP)            Ministry responsible and coordinates 
                                                                                                          with the CBD 
                                               
                                  Council (CA)          Advises the minister and ensures 
                                                                              Compliance with the Act 
 
                              Committee           Advises the Council 
 
                          
         Screens              Registrar        Issuance of permits  
       applications  
 
 Source: Generated by the author                                                                                                
 
3.2. Uganda 
In Uganda a number of institutions are involved in the various aspects of regulating 
modern biotechnology.  The Draft Biosafety Regulations under regulation 3 provide 
for various institutional frameworks.  The first institution is the National Focal Point 
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(NFP) which is the Ministry of Water, Lands and environment.183 This is the 
Government ministry responsible for environment and liaises with the CBD 
Secretariat on behalf of Uganda.  
 
Secondly, the draft regulations establish a Competent Authority (CA),184 
which is the Uganda National Council of Science and Technology (UNCST).  The 
UNCST follows up, supervises and controls the implementation of the INTERIM 
biosafety regulatory regime of Uganda.  The UNCST has all the powers to regulate 
modern biotechnology and the Government of Uganda may further specify duties 
stipulated in the relevant provisions of the draft regulations. However, the UNCST’s 
capacity to coordinate biotechnology development has been constrained by 
inadequate financial and infrastructure provisions coupled with a lack of clear 
definition of roles of the various institutions.   
 
Furthermore, a review of the UNCST Statute,185 reveals that it does not 
contain typical regulatory power and functions.  The UNCST Statute therefore, does 
not provide adequate legal authority and as a result the UNCST Statute does not 
support the Regulations.  In addition nothing in the UNCST Statute identifies the 
UNCST as having a role in safeguarding the environment or human health from 
science and technology activities including GMOs.  Therefore, while the UNCST is a 
government office that should be involved in setting up Uganda’s biosafety policy, 
the statute authorizing its creation does not provide legal authority to regulate 
GMOs. So if the draft regulations are finalized on that authority, they may not 
withstand legal challenge.  Thus, to provide adequate legal authority for the 
biosafety regulatory system, Uganda might consider either using other existing 
statutes or getting its parliament to pass biosafety legislation.186 
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Thirdly, the draft regulations establish the National Biosafety Committee 
(NBC).187  The NBC is established by the Competent Authority (CA) which is the 
UNCST and it comprises of representatives from the government, non-governmental 
organizations, and the private sector that are relevant to the issues of biotechnology 
and biosafety to provide, as appropriate, policy recommendations and guidelines on 
biosafety. The NBC consists of a minimum of ten and a maximum of twenty 
members.188 These are specialists in the fields covering a wide range of disciplines 
associated with biotechnology.  The NBC meets regularly to review projects and deal 
with relevant policy issues that come up in biotechnology from time to time.  The 
NBC provides technical advice on biosafety to government and maintains links with 
biotechnology institutions through institutional biosafety committees.  The NBC 
currently derives its legal status from the UNCST Statute, but there are plans to 
strengthen the NBC legally through its own legislation.  
 
Lastly, the draft regulations establish the Institutional Biosafety Committees 
(IBCs).  The IBCs are established in all institutions conducting biotechnology 
research or involved in the import, export, contained use, release into the 
environment or placing on the market of GMOs or GMO products.189  The IBCs 
ensure and control safety measures and approval requirements at the institutional 
level.  The IBCs report on all activities within institutions on a case-to-case basis and 
the reporting period is agreed upon with the Competent Authority.  Each IBC once 
formed consists of a biosafety officer and at least three other officers with relevant 
expertise.  The institutional framework under the interim biosafety regulatory 
regime of Uganda described above is summarized and set forth in illustration 2 
below. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
public nor have they been released as government draft documents. Thus, it is not included in this study’s 
analysis. 
187
 Regulation 3(3). 
188
 Regulation 3(3)(i). 
189
 Regulation 3(4). 
  
 
57 
Illustration 2: The institutional framework under the interim biosafety regulatory regime of 
Uganda 
 
          Ministry of Water Lands and Environment (NFP)            Ministry responsible and coordinates 
                                                                                                                           with the CBD 
                                               
  Takes decision           UNCST (CA)          Supervision and Implementation 
  and issues permits                                                                           
 
                                      NBC              Provides technical advice to the NBC 
 
                          
         Screens                  IBCs              Reports on activities within      
       Applications and                                institutions on a case to case 
     Proposals before                                                basis 
sending them to the NBC 
                            INSPECTORATE         Established in the respective lead agencies 
                                                                           such as environment, health and agriculture 
                                                                                   to monitor inspect and report 
  Source: Generated by the author                                                               
 
3.3. Monitoring, Inspection and Reporting  
Under Article 33 of the Cartagena Protocol as discussed in (8.0 of part C in chapter 2) 
calls upon each Party to monitor the implementation of its obligations under the 
Protocol.  Article 33 further provides that, each party  shall, at intervals to be 
determined by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to 
this Protocol, report to the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the 
Parties to this Protocol on measures that it has taken to implement the Protocol.  
Article 33 imposes two obligations on Parties.  The first obligation is to monitor their 
implementation of the Protocol and secondly, to report on measures that they have 
taken to implement the Protocol. 
 
3.3.1. South Africa 
In South Africa neither the GMO Act nor the GMO Amendment Act nor the GMO 
Regulations contain any provisions relating to monitoring and inspection.  There is 
provision for inspectors in the GMO Act and their duty is to police and patrol with 
the aim of preventing and detecting breaches of the GMO Act.190  Like many 
developing countries, South Africa is also faced with the problem of manpower 
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shortage and inadequate funding to effectively monitor activities relating to GMOs. 
This in turn has affected the smooth running of operations like data collection and 
management. 
 
3.3.2. Uganda 
Under the interim biosafety regulatory regime of Uganda, monitoring consists of 
general surveillance and depending on the results of the risk assessment, case 
specific monitoring.  An overview of the existing monitoring methods tailored for 
the Ugandan situation has not yet been put in place.  The UNCST shall coordinate 
monitoring activities after the methods have been established.191  
 
The draft regulations also make use of existing inspectorate bodies in Uganda 
for the monitoring and enforcement of the provisions of the law.192  These 
inspectorates are established in the respective lead agencies for inspection reporting. 
These inspectorates include: the Uganda Revenue Authority Customs (URA) for 
commodity food imports and placing on the market of GMOs; The National 
Agricultural Research Organization (NARO) Committee for variety testing, field 
inspection and seed control; the Uganda National Bureau of Standards (UNBS) for 
commodity food imports; the Department of Forestry; the Uganda Wildlife 
Authority (UWA); and the Ministry of Health (MOH); the Phytosanitary Department 
of the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries for plant imports, for 
contained use and environmental releases of GMOs.  However, although the 
inspectorates have some experience in the conventional inspections in their 
traditional fields, they have limited experience and approaches for inspections of 
activities involving GMOs. 
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3.4. Comparative Analysis 
Article 19 of the Protocol requires the Parties to designate National Focal Points 
(NFP) and Competent National Authorities (CA) to perform functions relating to the 
Protocol. Both the biosafety regulatory systems of South Africa and Uganda do 
comply with the Cartagena Protocol though at varying levels.  The Draft Biosafety 
Regulations of Uganda establish the Ministry of Water, Lands and Environment and 
the UNCST as the national focal point and competent authority respectively.  The 
GMO Act and the GMO Amendment Act of South Africa establish the Department 
of Agriculture and the Executive Council as the national focal point and competent 
authority respectively.  The contrast here is that unlike in South Africa, in Uganda 
the Ministry of Water, Lands and Environment is the national focal point or the 
responsible and not the ministry Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries.  
 
Other institutions that are provided for by the Draft Biosafety Regulations of 
Uganda include the NBC and IBCs.  The GMO Act also establishes the Advisory 
Committee and the office of the Registrar.  The Draft Biosafety Regulations of 
Uganda are silent about the establishment of the office of the registrar or an officer of 
the same rank.  The NBC under the Draft Biosafety Regulations of Uganda is the 
equivalent of the Advisory Committee under the GMO Act in South Africa. In their 
composition both the above institutions comprise of persons that have relevant 
knowledge of GMOs including those from the private sector.  However the Draft 
Biosafety Regulations of Uganda go a step further by including the civil society and 
non-governmental organizations.   South Africa should follow the same approach 
and include non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the civil society on the 
Advisory Committee. 
 
It is suggested that the institutional frameworks under the Draft Biosafety 
Regulations of Uganda are more decentralized than the institutions established 
under the GMO Act of South Africa.  For example the Draft biosafety Regulations of 
Uganda establish the IBCs at all the institutions conducting biotechnology research 
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or involved in the export, import, contained use, release into the environment or 
placing on the market of GMOs or their products.193  These IBCs report on activities 
within the institutions on a case-to-case basis in addition to clearing and reviewing 
prospective applications before they go to the NBC.  The IBCs also conduct training.  
South Africa should also adopt a similar approach so as to efficiently manage and 
monitor GMOs throughout the country. 
 
With regard to monitoring, the Protocol places two obligations on the Parties. 
First, is to monitor the implementation of the Protocol and secondly, to repot to the 
COP/MOP to the Protocol on measures that it has taken to implement the Protocol. 
The Draft Biosafety Regulations of Uganda have provisions for monitoring that 
consist of general surveillance.  The monitoring activities in Uganda are coordinated 
by the UNCST.  
 
The Draft Biosafety Regulations impose a duty of monitoring on the applicant 
as part of the conditions during the application procedure.  On the other hand, 
neither the GMO Act nor the GMO Amendment Act nor the GMO Regulations of 
South Africa contain any specific provisions relating to monitoring.  There is a 
provision for inspectors in the GMO Act but their duties are limited to patrolling 
and policing with the aim of detecting and preventing breaches of the GMO Act.194  
Unlike the GMO Act of South Africa, the Draft Biosafety Regulations of Uganda 
make use of the existing inspectorate bodies for monitoring and enforcement of the 
law.  This kind of coordination makes the work of the inspectors easier as they 
cannot do all the monitoring work on their own.  This is usually because problems 
such as under staffing and under funding from the central government.  The 
monitoring provisions of the biosafety regulatory framework in South Africa do not 
comply with the Protocol and this makes one to wonder whether the information 
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that South Africa submits to the COP/MOP with regard to monitoring and 
enforcement of the Protocol is accurate and reliable. 
 
4.0. The Advance Informed Agreement (AIA) 
The Cartagena Protocol (see 2.0 of part C in chapter 2) under Article 11(1) provides 
that, a party that makes a final decision regarding domestic use of an LMO that may 
be subject to transboundary movement shall inform the parties through the 
Biosafety Clearing-House (BCH) system.  This shall be within 15 days of reaching 
that decision.  Article 11(1) functions as a means of information sharing with respect 
to domestic regulations in the field of LMOs.  The domestic regulatory framework 
must be consistent with the objective of the Protocol. 
 
4.1. South Africa 
As provided for in the Protocol, the Advanced Informed Agreement (AIA) is meant 
to ensure that a party especially that of import is made aware before LMOs/GMOs 
are imported so that it can make a decision to import or not to import. Under the 
GMO Act and the GMO regulations, there are provisions for AIA.  The GMO 
Amendment Act does not contain a specific section dealing with the AIA procedure 
but section 4 of the GMO Amendment Act substitutes section 5 of the GMO Act in 
its entirety.  Provisions relating to the approval of applications are coupled with the 
powers and duties of the Council.  The procedure to be followed by an applicant is 
provided for by the GMO Amendment Act under section 5 (1) (a) and (b) and is 
discussed in detail in (4.3) of this chapter.  
 
The GMO Amendment Act also makes provision for factors to be taken into 
account while considering an application.  These factors to be taken into 
consideration include: scientifically based risk assessment,195 and proposed risk 
management measures,196 public input,197 EIA198 and socio-economic factors199.  The 
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GMO Regulations also require certain activities to be under taken only after a permit 
has been granted and issued by the Registrar.200  These activities include import and 
exportation, contained use, trail release, gene release and marketing of GMOs.  
However, this is one of the provisions that give the Registrar a lot of unchallenged 
powers that at times seem to exceed those given to him by the Council. 
 
4.2. Uganda 
The interim biosafety regulatory regime of Uganda also has a component of the 
Advanced Informed Agreement procedure though it does not have a specific title on 
AIA.  The Draft Biosafety Regulations define the advance informed agreement as 
“consent obtained from competent authority based upon full disclosure of all 
relevant information before ant activity is under taken”.201  Regulation 13 titled 
“Export and Import of GMO or its Living Product” provides that any person who 
intends to export a GMO or its living product shall provide the competent authority 
a written AIA of the competent authority of Uganda.202   
 
The AIA is a key mechanism and the centerpiece of transparency of any 
biosafety regulatory framework.  The draft regulations require that before the first 
intentional introduction of a GMO or its living product into Uganda’s jurisdiction, 
the competent authority is notified so that it receives information about the GMO 
and its proposed use and is also given an opportunity to decide whether or not to 
allow the import of the GMO, and upon what conditions if any. 
 
The Draft Biosafety Regulations further provide that the presentation of the 
AIA by an exporter shall in no way absolve the exporter from complying with any 
other laws governing foreign trade.203  These other laws governing foreign trade 
                                                                                                                                                 
198
 Section 5(2)( a)(ii). 
199
 Section 5(2)( a)(iii). 
200
 Regulation 5(1). 
201
 Regulation 1 (a). 
202
 Regulation 13 (1). 
203
 Regulation 13 (2). 
  
 
63 
include the WTO Rules.  Lastly, the Draft Biosafety Regulations provide that there 
shall be no authorizations for re-export of a GMO or its living products that are 
banned by the laws of Uganda.204  This provision is good in a way that ensures that 
the rest of the world is protected from harm that could be caused from that 
genetically modified organism or its living products.  Because once it is banned, it 
will not be re-exported to another country where it may be introduced into the 
environment.   
 
However, apart from the heading of regulation 13, the provisions of the draft 
regulations do not mention any thing about the “import” of GMOs into Uganda.  
The provisions only mention the “export” of GMOs from Uganda.  The Draft 
Biosafety Regulations define export as “the intentional transboundary movement 
from Uganda to another country”205 and import is defined as “the intentional 
transboundary movement into Uganda”.206 
 
4.3. Procedure 
This section of the study describes and examines the application and decision 
making procedures under the biosafety legislation of South Africa and the interim 
biosafety regime of Uganda. 
 
4.3.1. South Africa 
In terms of the GMO Act, the minister is empowered to make regulations regarding 
the application and for the issue of permits.207  The GMO Act further states that, ‘no 
applicant may import to or export from the Republic of South Africa, or develop, or 
produce, use, release or distribute any genetically modified organism  in the 
Republic of South Africa except in terms  of a permit to under take such activity’. 208 
Activities that require a permit have been listed in the relevant regulations to 
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include: the importation and exportation of GMOs, trial release of GMOs, and the 
general release and marketing of GMOs. 
 
Regulation 2(1) is however, subject to the provisions of regulation 2(2) which 
states that ‘a permit shall not be required for organisms that are used under 
conditions of contained use in academic and research facilities, and for those 
organisms that are specified in table 3’.209  This mechanism is meant to serve as an 
exclusion list to fast track commercial releases of genetically modified seed, food and 
animal feed, and to expedite trade in GMOs.  Strangely however, the table includes 
virtually all GMOs used in South Africa today.210  Neither the GMO Act nor the 
GMO Amendment Act or the GMO Regulations of South Africa set out a specific 
decision-making mechanism regarding this category of GMOs.  It is therefore 
possible for a decision to be made without public knowledge and participation and, 
perhaps more importantly, without conducting an EIA, before approval of the 
GMO.211  The mechanism created here, as a possible exclusion of a permit 
requirement, has a potential to render the GMO Act meaningless.212 
 
As noted above, a permit is not required for GMOs under contained use 
conditions in academic and research facilities.  Rather, the facilities where the GMOs 
are being developed, produced, used or applied require registration.213  However, 
the requirements for the registration of facilities do not go far enough in ensuring 
that abuses and circumvention of the stated purpose of research do not take place.  
The current method of approval by the National Department of Agriculture, namely, 
the issuing of one import permit for several GM varieties to be imported on one 
shipment, will mot make not possible for South Africa to comply with the provisions 
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of the Protocol.  The approval procedure under the GMO Act of South Africa 
described above is summarized and set forth in illustration 3 below. 
 
Illustration 3: The approval procedure under the GMO Act of South Africa 
 
                        Public notice of trial release 
                      
                                              30 Days 
                                 Application 
    
 
                                   Registrar          Screens applications 
 
                          
    May request              Council          Takes decision  
Risk assessment or  
EIA and may consider 
Socio-economic impact 
 
                                    Registrar            Issues permit 
 
Source: Generated by the author                                                                                          
 
4.3.2. Uganda 
The Draft Biosafety Regulations under regulation 4 establish application and 
approval procedures.  Regulation 4 states the no person shall import, export, release 
into the environment, contained use, or place on the market a genetically modified 
organism with out the approval of the UNCST.  Regulation 4 further provides that 
any person that intends to make any generation, import, export, release into the 
environment, contained use, or place on the market a genetically modified organism 
or its living product shall submit an application in writing to the UNCST.214  The 
application shall include an assessment report on possible adverse effects caused by 
the GMOs, information specified in Annex I or and other such information as may 
be prescribed by the UNCST, information from previous or current releases of 
GMOs, information on previous approvals and rejections of the GMOs by any other 
country, and the place where and the purpose for which the GMO and its product 
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shall be used for including detailed instructions for use and detailed labeling and 
packaging in accordance with the regulations.215   
 
The main mechanism for the regulation of ‘contained use’ under the draft 
regulations is a registration system for premises.  A permit is required for certain 
contained use activities and for the regulation of the ‘deliberate release’.  A permit is 
also required for the ‘import or placing on the market’ of GMOs under the draft 
regulations.  Regulation 6 of the Draft Biosafety Regulations provides that the 
UNCST in accordance with the Biosafety Guidelines may decide that an application 
may proceed, proceed with such conditions as it may specify, or not proceed,216 and 
such decisions shall be notified to the applicant with in 270 days from the receipt of 
the application.217  The Competent Authority (UNCST) may request for further 
information as it may deem necessary to make decision.218  In an event where there 
is reason to suspect threats of damage, lack of scientific evidence shall not be used as 
a basis for not taking precautionary measures.219  
 
Furthermore, the draft regulations provide that, for the approval for 
generation, import, export, contained use, release into the environment, or placing 
on the market of a GMO shall require the applicant to carry out monitoring and 
evaluation of risks. 220  And lastly, no approval of a GMO shall be considered and 
duly determined by the competent authority unless it will contribute to sustainable 
development, not have adverse socio-economic impacts, and accord with ethical 
values and concerns of communities and does not undermine traditional knowledge 
and technologies.221 
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A key component of a biosafety regulatory system is a clearly articulated 
safety standard, which is used to judge applications for approval by the competent 
authority.  The interim biosafety regulatory regime of Uganda does not provide such 
a standard. In Uganda, neither the Biosafety policy nor the Regulations set forth a 
clear safety standard for approving GMOs.  Though the draft regulations require 
that approval is required before undertaking any activity involving GMOs, they do 
not provide any criteria to determine whether to grant the approval or not.  The 
approval procedure under the interim biosafety regulatory regime of Uganda 
described above is summarized and set forth in illustration 4 below. 
 
Illustration 4: The approval procedure under the interim biosafety regulatory regime of 
Uganda                                              
                                               
                                 Application    
 
                                    UNCST          Screens applications 
 
                          
    Requests for a             NBC            Provides technical advice to UNCST  
Risk assessment or  
EIA and considers 
Socio-economic impact 
                                    UNCST              
 
 
                          Public notice of trial release 
                                             30 days 
                                    UNCST          Takes decision and issues permit  
 
Source: Generated by the author                                                                                                
 
4.4. Comparative Analysis 
Both the biosafety regulatory systems of Uganda and South Africa do not have 
specific provisions titled Advance Informed Agreement (AIA).  However, both 
biosafety regulatory systems do provide for the AIA procedure within their 
mechanisms in different ways.   This is through the different procedures that are 
undertaken and the different factors that are put into consideration before an 
application is approved.  The Protocol limits its self to the ‘first intentional 
transboundary movement’.   The Draft Biosafety Regulations of Uganda to a greater 
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extent comply with the Protocol as illustrated by regulation 13.  Draft regulation 13 
of Uganda provides that ‘any person that intends to export a GMO or its living 
product shall provide to the competent authority a written AIA’.   However, this 
provision has shortcomings because it only provides for the ‘export’ and not the 
‘import’ of a GMO as the AIA procedure is mainly concerned with the importation 
of GMOs.  Since the regulations are still in draft form this provision needs to be 
corrected.  On the other hand the GMO Amendment Act makes no mention of the 
first intentional transboundary movements of GMOs. 
 
Whereas the Protocol under Article 6 provides that the AIA procedure shall 
not apply to GMOs in transit (see 2.1 of part C in chapter 2), both the Draft Biosafety 
Regulations of Uganda and the GMO Act and the GMO Amendment Act of South 
are silent with regard to GMOs in transit.  The Draft Biosafety Regulations of 
Uganda have a novel provision that states that there shall be no authorization for the 
re-exportation of a GMO or its living product that are banned by the laws of 
Uganda.222  The GMO Act and the GMO Amendment Act of South Africa do not 
have such a provision but it is worth adopting because it ensures that the banned 
GMOs are not re-exported and released in another country. 
 
Both the biosafety regulatory systems of Uganda and South Africa rely on 
registration and the permit system as the main mechanism for approval.  In Uganda 
approval is granted by the UNCST and in South Africa the Council grants 
approval.223   Whereas the UNCST in Uganda may decide that, an application may 
‘proceed, proceed with conditions as it may specify, or not to proceed’,224 the GMO 
Amendment Act only empowers the Council to ‘decide whether to approve’ an 
application.  A thorough analysis of this provision under the GMO Amendment Act 
suggests that the Council has no specific powers to reject an application.  Like most 
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developing countries, South Africa and Uganda face a problem of political 
interference especially by the ministers concerned during decision taking process. 
 
With regard to time frames between the time of the receipt of the application 
and the final decision, the Protocol provides for a minimum of ninety days and a 
maximum of 270 days.  The Draft Biosafety Regulations of Uganda comply with the 
Protocol because they also provide for a total of 270 days.225  On the other hand the 
GMO Amendment Act does not have substantive provisions with regard to time 
frames between the notification date and the decision date, the provisions on time 
frames is left to the GMO Regulations that provide for different time frames for 
approval of different activities regarding GMOs. The approval procedures of 
applications under the GMO Amendment Act do not comply with the Protocol and 
its unfortunate that the new GMO Amendment Act failed to address this issue. 
 
Both the biosafety regulatory frameworks of Uganda and South Africa 
consider other factors like socio-economic considerations.  But the Draft Biosafety 
Regulations of Uganda under regulation 6(7) are more elaborate by further 
providing that ‘no approval of a GMO shall be considered and duly determined by 
the competent authority unless it will contribute to sustainable development and not 
have adverse socio-economic impacts, and accord with ethical values and concerns 
of communities and does not under mine traditional knowledge and technologies’. 
 
It is apparent that the biosafety regulatory framework of Uganda to a greater 
extent complies with the AIA procedure that is provided for by the Protocol though 
it also has its shortfalls.  The AIA approach that is taken by South Africa still falls 
short of complying with the Protocol it creates a lot of uncertainty due to its 
vagueness. 
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5.0. Risk Assessment and Management 
The Protocol provides that, before any GMO is released (as discussed in 4.1 of part C 
of chapter 2), an evaluation of the impacts and risks posed to human health and the 
environment by the release should be carried out.  This is meant to identify if there 
are any hazards posed by the GMO to human health or the environment, the 
magnitude of the harm, and what the risks are if the hazards are released.226 Once 
the risks have been estimated, the assessment should identify whether or not any 
management procedures are required to control the risk and prevent or minimize 
damage to the environment or whether or not monitoring is required to determine 
that any risk control measure is effective.227 
 
Risk management under the Protocol as discussed in (4.2 of part C in chapter 
2) refers to means by which a user applies certain control measures to an operation 
in order to keep the risks to an acceptable level.  Having identified and assessed the 
risk the next step is to consider how the risk can be minimized and best managed.  
The type of risk management to be applied depends on the novel organisms on the 
particular application.  Risk management measures that are used to keep risks at a 
minimum include containment and assignment of biosafety levels.228 
 
5.1. Risk Assessment  
5.1.1. South Africa 
Risk assessments are not mandatory in terms of the GMO Act and the GMO 
Amendment Act.  This is because both the GMO Act and the GMO Amendment Act 
do not contain substantive provisions governing risk assessment.  Rather, under 
section 5 (a) of the GMO Act the Council has extra ordinary wide discretionary 
powers to determine when an environmental impact assessment is required.  
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Regulation 3(1) of the GMO Regulations, however, prohibits any person from under 
taking ‘any activity involving genetic modification unless a suitable and adequate 
assessment of the risks created thereby to the environment and human health has 
been made’.  At first glance it appears as though this provision obliges the Council to 
consider the risk or environmental impact assessment before making a decision 
regarding the granting of a permit.229  However, such an obligation exists only 
where the activity involves “genetic modification” and not where the activity 
involves for example, the release of GMOs into the environment.230 Consequently, 
the Council retains its discretionary powers to determine when a risk assessment 
and an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) are required for all activities 
excluding the actual genetic modification of an organism. 
 
It is submitted that in exercising its discretion, the Council is obliged to 
consider the National Environment Management Act (NEMA) principles 
enumerated in section 2 of NEMA.  These NEMA principles apply throughout the 
South Africa to the actions of all organs of state that may significantly affect the 
environment.231  A precise interpretation of the words ‘may significantly affect the 
environment’ is problematic.  It is argued that the best if not the only, way to 
determine whether an action may “significantly” affect the environment is to 
conduct an EIA.232  In the case of Minister of Public Works and Others v Kyalami Ridge 
Environmental Association and Others,233 the Constitutional Court considered the 
meaning of the phrase ‘may significantly affect the environment’.  The court noted 
that in the circumstances the Kyalami residents had failed to show as a probability 
that the establishment of the Camp at Leeukop ‘would’ have a significant effect on 
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the environment.  This interpretation is incorrect, as the Kyalami residents ought 
only to have had to prove that the activity in question ‘may’ have had a significant 
effect on the environment.234  In the case of Hichange Investments (Pty) Ltd v Cape 
Produce Company (Pty) Ltd t/a Pelts Products & 4 Others,235 the question of what is to 
be considered as significant arose.  The Court noted that, in light of the 
Constitutional right a person has to an environment conducive to health and well 
being, the threshold level of significance will not be particularly high.236  This view is 
supported because the question of what is to be regarded as significant must be seen 
in the light of the constitutional right to an environment conducive to health and 
well being, as well as the relevant principles in NEMA.237 
 
Neither the GMO Act nor the Regulations set out the principles or the 
parameters of the risk assessments, a factor that affects the Council when exercising 
its powers of requiring a risk assessment.  It is also important to note that the 
regulations impose very short time limits for the regulators to respond to 
applications that require EIAs.238  This means that regulators may have insufficient 
time to consider any risk assessments that may have been done.  The short time 
frame is weighted in favour of expediting trade in GMOs rather than ensuring that 
adequate time is spent on assessing potential impacts on the environment.239  
Furthermore, the GMO Act allows the Council to make decisions based on risk 
assessments carried out by the applicant.240  This means that, strictly speaking, the 
Council is unable to base its decision on an independent risk assessment.  The 
Council is, however, obliged to consult the Committee.  The Committee must in 
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turn, invite written comments from ‘knowledgeable persons’ on any aspect of GMOs 
with in its brief.241 
 
The GMO Act and the GMO Amendment Act both lay emphasis on scientific 
based risk assessments and the involvement of scientists.242  The concerns with the 
scientific based approach in risk assessments is that it diverts attention away from 
the EIAs, socio-economic considerations as well as the involvement of experts in 
these fields. 
 
5.1.2. Uganda 
The interim biosafety regulatory regime of Uganda establishes mechanisms for risk 
assessments and management in addition to fundamental steps in risk assessment.  
In Uganda risk assessment is referred to as Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA). 
In Uganda, EIAs are governed by the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
Regulations.243  The Draft Biosafety Regulations provide for risk assessments under 
regulation 8.  Regulation 8 provides that a risk assessment of a GMO shall be carried 
out by an applicant or the competent authority as appropriate, on a case-by-case 
basis and shall be done in accordance with the national biosafety guidelines.244  
Regulation 8 further provides that the competent authority shall evaluate or cause 
the evaluation of the risk assessment report and consider the result of such an 
evaluation in making its decision on any application regarding GMOs.245  These 
provisions illustrate that the Ugandan biosafety regulatory system assesses the risks 
that are posed by GMOs and the results are considered before the competent 
authority takes a decision regarding an application for a GMO.  
 
The Regulations further provide that the competent authority may require 
the applicant to bear all the costs for evaluating the risk assessment report or 
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carrying out the risk assessment, as the case may be.246  Risk Assessments and EIAs 
are an important aspect of environmental Management in Uganda as illustrated by 
the case of Advocates Coalition for Development and Environment (ACODE) v Attorney 
General.247  In this case the applicants an NGO contended among other things that 
the respondent had allocated a public forest reserve to the second respondent an 
investor for sugar cane planting without carrying out an EIA yet there was a change 
if land use involved in the process.  The respondent argued that no EIA was 
required as long as measures to protect the environment had been taken.  The Court 
held that if a permit was granted to the second respondent it would be null and void 
by the fact that no project brief and EIA was carried out as required by the law.  
 
However, in some instances there is no provision for independent review of 
EIAs and risk assessments under the draft regulations. At times the applicant is 
required to pay the costs for carrying out the risk assessment and the evaluation of 
the risk assessment.  This may however, compromise the whole process as chances 
are that the application of the applicant that has funded the whole process will not 
be rejected.   
 
5.2. Risk Management 
5.2.1. South Africa 
With regard to risk management, neither the GMO Act nor the GMO Amendment 
Act specifically provides for risk management.  It is only the GMO Regulations that 
make some reference to accidents arising from GMOs.  The regulations require that 
in case of such accidents, the Registrar should be notified immediately both verbally 
and in writing.  However, there are no other risk management measures like 
monitoring and periodic observation under the GMO Act.248 
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5.2.2. Uganda 
The Draft Biosafety Regulations provide for risk management under Regulation 9.  
Regulation 9 provides that the competent authority shall impose such measures 
upon approval, as may be necessary, to avoid adverse effects on the environment, 
biological diversity and health, including the socio-economic considerations, arising 
from a GMO or its product.249  Other risk management measures that are provided 
for by Regulation 9 include:  
 
a) Periodic observation of the GMO before its put to its intended use;250  
b) Order for the cessation of any activity that is under taken in violation of the 
provisions of the Regulations;251  
c) Order for the cessation of any activity that involves GMOs that are proven to 
cause risks to the environment, biological diversity or health;252  
d) Require person responsible for any activity to undertake such measures as 
may be necessary to prevent or limit harm to the environment, biological 
diversity or health, or to restore the environment to its previous state as far as 
feasible;253  
e) Take measures as necessary in the case of eminent danger to the 
environment, biological diversity or health caused by a GMO at the cost of 
the person responsible for causing such danger;254 and  
f) Require the applicant to submit reports periodically in respect of the 
monitoring and evaluation of the risks carried out after the approval of the 
GMO.255 
 
The provisions (regulation 9) as stated above relating to risk management in the 
interim biosafety regulatory regime of Uganda illustrates that many principles of 
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environmental management are considered.  These include the polluter pays 
principle, the preventive principle, and the precautionary principle.  Regulation 9 
further provides for monitoring and evaluation reports that are submitted 
periodically by the applicant even though the GMO has already been approved by 
the competent authority. 
 
5.3. Comparative Analysis 
Both the biosafety regulatory systems of South Africa and Uganda contain 
provisions on risk assessment and management.  Article 15 the Cartagena Protocol 
(see 4.0 of part C in chapter 2) provides that risk assessments shall be carried out in a 
scientifically sound manner.  The Protocol does not provide clear guidance where 
uncertainty arises in relation to risk assessment.  The Draft Biosafety Regulations of 
Uganda comply with the Protocol because they have established mechanisms for 
risk assessment under Regulation 8.  The applicant or the competent authority 
carries out the risk assessment under the Draft Biosafety Regulations of Uganda but 
the GMO Act of South Africa makes no mention of who should conduct the risk 
assessment.  The Draft Biosafety Regulations of Uganda also provide for mandatory 
evaluation of the risk assessment report before it makes its decision, but under the 
GMO Act of South Africa, the applicant is required to submit an assessment on the 
impact on the environment if the Council determines that it is it is needed.256 
 
The draft biosafety regulations in Uganda provide that the competent 
authority may require the applicant to bear the costs of carrying out the risk 
assessment or the evaluation of the risk assessment.  This puts the competent 
authority in a compromising position because it will be difficult for them to be 
impartial and unbiased in reaching their decision if all their bills have been footed by 
the applicant. It is suggested that because of financial constraints, at most, the 
applicant should only bear the costs of the risk assessment but not the costs of the 
evaluation of the risk assessment. Both the biosafety regulatory systems of South 
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Africa and Uganda do not set out the principles or parameters of the risk 
assessments.  This factor affects Council and the UNCST respectively when 
exercising their powers of requiring a risk assessment since time factor is an 
important aspect in carrying out risks assessments.  In most cases a shorter time 
frame is preferred and this affects the quality of the risk assessments.  
 
With regard to risk management, regulation 9 of the Draft Biosafety 
Regulations of Uganda requires the competent authority to impose such measures 
upon approval, as may be necessary, to avoid adverse effects on the environment, 
biological diversity and health, including socio-economic considerations arising 
from the GMO or its product.257  The Draft Biosafety Regulations of Uganda also 
provide for a range of other risk management measures that include: periodic 
observation, ordering for cessation of the activity in case it violates provisions of the 
regulations, require a person that causes damage to take measures as may be 
necessary to limit the harm or restore the environment to its previous state at their 
cost, and requiring the applicant to submit periodic reports in respect of monitoring 
and the evaluation of risks carried out after approval of the project.  In contrast, the 
GMO Act and the GMO Amendment Act of South Africa do not have any additional 
risk management measures like periodic observation and submission of periodic 
reports by the applicant even after the approval of the GMO.  This leaves the risk 
management provisions of the GMO Act and the GMO Amendment Act of South 
Africa inadequate and wanting. 
 
It is suggested that the biosafety regulatory system of Uganda to a greater 
extent complies with the Cartagena Protocol as far as risk assessment and 
management are concerned.  But the biosafety legislation of South Africa still falls 
short of complying with the Protocol and its unfortunate that even the GMO 
Amendment Act has not done much to address this situation. 
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6.0. Public Awareness and Participation  
Public participation in a biosafety regulatory system usually involves two separate 
components.  First, is the public being given opportunity to provide comments and 
opinions on the laws, regulations, and policies before they are adopted.  Secondly, 
the opportunity to provide comments before an application for GMOs is approved 
by the competent authority.  Public participation is different from public awareness, 
where the government educates and informs the public about biosafety, 
biotechnology, and the regulatory process.  
 
6.1. South Africa 
The GMO Act and the GMO Amendment Act have no substantive provisions 
relating to public participation but the GMO Regulations,258 provide for it though 
not in a clearly defined manner.  In the context of the GMO Act, notification refers to 
the information the applicant is under legal obligation to supply to the competent 
authority together with the risk assessment report.  The notification process is 
inextricably linked to public participation in so far as the public should be kept 
informed of the status of approvals, be furnished with the information supplied 
under the notification process and be given an opportunity to supply comments.259 
The Committee and the Council take these comments into account during the 
decision-making process.  The consultation process is an essential component of 
environmental governance and justice.260 
 
The GMO Act deals with public participation and notification only in the 
context of permit applications.261  Notification must occur prior to an application for 
a permit. Notification is to be in the form of a standard notice published in the print 
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media informing the public of the intended release.262  The notice must contain, inter 
alia, a request that interested parties submit comments or objections in conjunction 
with the intended release to the Registrar with in no more than thirty days from the 
date of the notice.   
 
The provisions in the GMO Act relating to public participation and 
notification are in adequate because of the following reasons: 
 
  First, the provisions only apply in the context of permit applications.  So, for 
example, because a permit is not required for GMOs under contained use conditions 
in academic and research facilities, decisions regarding this category of GMOs can 
be made withy out public participation and in the absence of public knowledge.  
This category of GMOs effectively by-passes the decision making procedure set out 
in the Act yet the vast majority of international biosafety laws require step by step 
approvals of GMOs.263  That is, releases of GMOs are approved first for the activity 
under contained use conditions, then for open field trials and then there is 
authorization for commercial releases.  Authorizations are required at each stage of 
the process, and every stage of the activity is monitored for risks.  Secondly, this 
implies that the notifications need not to be given to the public at large, but merely 
to those in the area in which the proposed release will occur.  This is not satisfactory 
as the risks arising from the areas where the release takes place is of national 
importance. 
 
Thirdly, the information that the applicant is required to furnish is 
inadequate for the purpose of equipping the public to participate in any meaningful 
way.264  The GMO Act only provides for a right to access only to information 
regarding the ‘evaluation of foreseeable impacts, in particular any pathogenic or 
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ecologically disruptive ones’. 265  Thus, the Public may be precluded from gaining 
access to information on the ‘potential or likely’ impact and risks posed by the GMO 
in question to the environment.  This right is further tampered with, as the Council 
is empowered to determine, in consultation with the applicant, which information 
will be kept confidential.266  In fact, the Council is obliged to consult the applicant in 
order to decide which information should be kept confidential.  In addition to this, 
with the general power to determine what information is to be kept confidential, the 
Council is further empowered to treat information necessary to protect the 
intellectual property rights of the applicant confidential.267  
 
Fundamentally, the risk assessment report itself should be made available to 
the members of the public for critical analysis.  The argument that there is need for 
secrecy to surround risk analysis as a way of protecting propriety information in a 
competitive market has worn thin.268  Commercial interests should no longer be 
allowed to trump the rights of the individual or the well being of the environment.269 
Fourthly, there is no provision for public participation in either the Executive 
Council or the Advisory Committee.  Lastly, the Regulations impose a very short 
time limit for interested and affected parties to respond.270  As a result the public is 
prevented from commenting meaningfully on any permit applications.  There is 
need for more time in order to ensure that the imperative to expedite trade in GMOs 
does not preclude constructive public participation and the assessment of potential 
impacts on the environment.271 
 
The provisions relating to public participation in the GMO Act do not comply 
with the NEMA principles contained in section 2 of National Environmental 
Management Act (NEMA).  Section 2 requires that participation of all interested and 
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affected parties in the environmental governance must be promoted.  Section 2 of the 
GMO Act further provides that all people must have an opportunity to develop the 
understanding, skills and capacity necessary for achieving equitable and effective 
participation.  Participation by vulnerable and disadvantaged persons must also be 
ensured.272  But the reality is that in most cases the affected parties are not identified, 
instead, the releases are shrouded in secrecy.273   The lack of publicly available 
information on what is happening in relation to GMOs makes it extremely difficult 
to monitor whether or not the existing legislation is being complied with. That is, 
with out access to information, the public is not able to determine whether or not 
private parties or the Department of Agriculture are infringing the rights of the 
public under the Constitution,274 the GMO Act and its regulations, NEMA, or 
international Conventions to which South Africa is party.  
 
The situation is exacerbated by the confidentiality provisions in the GMO 
Act,275 and the recalcitrant attitude of the National Department of Agriculture in 
relation to requests for information.276  This has in fact led to court challenges on the 
grounds of the public’s right to access to information held by the state under the 
provisions of section 32 of the constitution and the Promotion of Access to 
information Act (PAIA).277  This was illustrated by the case of The Trustees for the time 
being of the Biowatch Trust v the Registrar of Genetic Resources and Others278 where the 
applicant Non-governmental organization (NGO) invoked the right to information 
and the GMO Act to require the respondents to furnish reports on the commercial 
release of certain GMO crops in the South Africa agricultural sector. 
An appeals procedure is provided for in the GMO Act, but this is only useful 
to members of the public if they know when an applicant has been notified of the 
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approval.  The onus is on the public to find out when an applicant was notified of a 
decision, in order to lodge an appeal timeously, namely, within 30 days from the 
date the applicant was notified. 
6.2. Uganda 
The interim biosafety regulatory regime of Uganda provides for public awareness 
and participation.  The Draft biosafety Regulations under regulation 5 provide for 
public awareness and participation.  Regulation 5 states that the public shall be 
availed with information by the competent authority with in 30 days upon receipt of 
such information and this shall not prejudice the right to confidential business 
information.279   
 
Furthermore, the public may make comments at the time of notification, 
where the competent authority arranges for a public consultation.  The draft 
regulations further provide that a date of public participation and consultation is 
announced in the national media at least 30 days before the decision is made,280 the 
competent authority in reviewing its decision shall take into account the views and 
concerns of the public expressed.281  Lastly, the UNCST shall make public 
information regarding GMO approvals that have been granted or denied and risk 
assessment reports with respect to GMOs.282  Apart from the Draft Biosafety 
Regulations, public participation Uganda especially regarding the EIA process is 
regulated by the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Public Hearing Guidelines 
of 1999.283 
With the above provisions, a Ugandan decision maker may feel more 
compelled to consider public comments before a GMO release can be approved. 
Public awareness and participation is an important aspect of environmental 
procedural rights in Uganda.  This was illustrated by the case of Advocates Coalition 
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for Development and Environment (ACODE) v Attorney General284 where the court held 
that, if a change of land use permit was granted it would be null and void as the 
alienation of a forest reserve could only be done with due consultation and 
participation of the local community as provided for by the law. 
 
6.2.1. Transparency 
Transparency is a very important aspect of any biosafety regulatory system as it 
creates public confidence in decisions taken.285  The interim biosafety regulatory 
regime of Uganda has provisions that ensure that the systems are transparent.  The 
Draft biosafety Regulations under regulation 5 (5) specifically state that the 
competent authority will make available to the public the risk assessment of the 
GMOs.  The Draft Biosafety Regulations of Uganda under regulation 5 (1) and 5 (3) 
also balance the rights of the public to information with the rights of the developer 
or applicant to protect confidential business information.  These provisions not only 
protect confidential information but they also ensure that the public receives at least 
a minimal amount of information about the GMO that cannot be claimed to be 
confidential.286  These provisions are consistent with the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety, which promotes transparency but allows for the protection of confidential 
information in Article 21. 
 
6.3. Comparative Analysis 
The Draft Biosafety Regulations of Uganda comply with the provisions of Article 23 
of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety.  Under Article 23 of the Protocol the parties 
are required to ‘promote and facilitate’ public awareness and education on LMOs 
that may be imported.  The Cartagena Protocol further calls on the parties to consult 
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the public in the decision making process and make the results of such decisions 
available to the public.287  The Draft Biosafety Regulations of Uganda under 
regulation 5 provide for public awareness and Participation where the public is 
notified by the competent authority, the public makes comments, advertisement in 
the media, comments of the public are taken into account by the UNCST before 
decision is reached and confidentiality of business information is also taken into 
account. 
 
The Draft Biosafety Regulations of Uganda also a step further by making 
provision for public awareness.  It is a fact that there is limited public awareness and 
a lot of misinformation with the respect to the techniques, basic applications, 
opportunities, utility and safety of modern biotechnology and GMOs.  The 
knowledge of modern biotechnology and its full implication for development are 
still confined to a few individuals and certain categories of Ugandan society.  As a 
means of stimulating public participation, public awareness is a very important 
component that should not be over looked.  
 
In Uganda public awareness campaigns have taken the form of sensitization 
workshops, development of a web site by the UNCST, translation of the biosafety 
regulatory policy in four main languages, dissemination of best practices in 
biotechnology and biosafety to target institutions, dissemination of information in 
the electronic media e.g. FM radio and TV programmes and development of a 
curriculum in biotechnology and biosafety for schools and colleges.288  All the above 
measures are meant to ensure that the Ugandan public is fully aware of the events 
takes place in the field of biosafety and biotechnology so that they can effectively 
participate in the decision making process fully aware of their role.  However, like in 
many developing countries, the public awareness campaigns in Uganda also do not 
                                                 
287
 Article 23(2). 
288
 Mugoya C, op cit n191 at 9-10. 
  
 
85 
have the desired impact on the target groups and these campaigns at times only 
appear on paper do not actually take place. 
 
The South African GMO Act and the GMO Amendment Act of South Africa 
fall short of complying with the provisions of Article 23 of the Protocol.  The GMO 
Act and the GMO Amendment Act do not have provisions specifically relating to 
public awareness and participation, currently public participation is provided for by 
the GMO Regulations.289  The provisions of public participation in the Regulations 
are also framed in a limited context.  Under the GMO Regulations, public 
participation and notification is only in the context of permit applications.  Unlike 
the Draft Biosafety Regulations of Uganda, the ‘Council’ under the GMO 
Amendment Act is under a duty to consider all the comments and objections form 
the public when considering an application for the release of GMOs,290 however, 
there is no duty to publish the decisions taken. 
 
The biosafety legislation of South Africa makes no mention of public 
awareness as it only provides for ‘public participation and notification’.  With such 
provisions under the GMO Act, the public shall not be in a position to comment or 
respond to something that they have not been sensitized about.   It is suggested that 
the biosafety legislation of South Africa should also make provisions for Public 
awareness.  
 
Furthermore, the provisions on public awareness and participation under the 
GMO Act and the GMO Amendment Act do not only fall short of complying with 
the Cartagena Protocol, but they also do not comply with section 32 of the 
Constitution that provides for the right to information and the Provisions of the 
Promotion to Access of Information Act (PAIA).291   The GMO Act and the GMO 
Amendment Act do not also comply with Section 33 of the Constitution that 
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provides for procedurally fair administrative action and also Sections 3 and 4 of the 
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act (PAJA),292 which sets out the requirements 
for procedural fairness.   This is because the public is not given ‘adequate’ notice as 
required by PAJA.293  Accordingly, the defects described above cannot be addressed 
by requesting for information under PAIA because the request for information 
under PAIA takes 30 days to process and the period for commenting on a GMO 
application also takes 30 days, calculated from the date of the published notice.  So 
by the time a member of the public obtains the risk assessment report or any other 
document under PAIA, the period for commenting would have expired. 
 
7.0. Socio-Economic Considerations 
Consideration of socio-economic impacts and issues during the decision making 
process is an important aspect of sustainable development and intergenerational 
equity.  Taking into account of socio-economic considerations ensures that proposed 
projects are in harmony with the social well being of the people concerned and the 
surrounding environment. 
 
7.1. South Africa 
While making decisions it is essential for the decision makers to take into account 
socio-economic considerations.  The Cartagena Protocol has provisions on socio-
economic considerations under Article 26 (see 6.0 of part C in chapter 2), though its 
wording “may take into account” does not create obligations to the parties to take 
them into account.294  
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The GMO Act does not have specific provisions for socio-economic 
considerations in decision-making.  The GMO Act under section 5 (g) provides that 
after consideration of the risk assessment and where required, the environmental 
impact assessment, the council may authorize the registrar to issue a permit for the 
purpose for which the application was made or for the release of a GMO into the 
environment.  Section 5(g) of the GMO Act creates doubt as to whether the socio-
economic considerations are as a matter of fact taken into account by the Council 
while making the final decision.  The GMO Amendment Act introduces socio-
economic considerations into the decision making process.  However, the GMO 
Amendment Act provides for the taking into account of the socio-economic 
considerations in a vague manner.295  
 
The above provisions of the GMO Act clearly illustrate that that socio-
economic considerations are only taken into account by the Council only after it has 
determined that such a consideration is necessary.  It is suggested that the Council 
should be obliged to take socio-economic considerations into account rather than 
doing it on a discretionary basis.  To make matters worse, section 5(2)(a) provides 
that, when making a final decision the Council “may” consider public input, EIA or 
the potential socio-economic impact of such activities.  Controversy surrounding the 
aspect of taking into consideration the socio-economic impacts in decision-making 
under the GMO Act is illustrated by the case of BP South Africa (Pty) Ltd v MEC for 
Agriculture, Conservation and Land Affairs.296  The Court held that the balancing of 
environmental interests with justifiable socio and economic development is to be 
conceptualized well beyond the present living generation.  The Court further 
observed that that section 24 of the constitution provides that the environment must 
be protected for the benefit of the present and the future generations.297  This case 
clearly illustrates that socio-economic considerations contain an aspect of sustainable 
development and the principle of inter generational equity. 
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In its provisions relating to socio-economic considerations the Protocol is 
concerned with the effects arising from LMOs while emphasizing the importance of 
biological diversity to the indigenous and local communities in such areas.  The 
provisions of the GMO Amendment Act relating to socio-economic considerations 
appear general and vague as they do not specify the areas that will be affected and 
by what.  The GMO Amendment Act simply states that before making a decision, 
the socio-economic impact of the activity may be taken into account as an alternative 
to the EIA and vice-versa.298 
 
Socio-economic considerations in decision-making are meant to serve the 
interests of the population especially the local population that will be affected by 
that decision.  The GMO Amendment Act has however, failed to make provision for 
mandatory consideration of socio-economic impacts.  This puts the GMO 
Amendment Act in conflict with the provisions of the Protocol. Thus, the GMO 
Amendment Act has not been able to address the problem that was created by the 
parent GMO Act. 
 
7.2. Uganda 
The interim biosafety regulatory regime of Uganda recognizes the need to address 
socio-economic considerations that may arise from GMOs.  The Uganda Draft 
Biosafety Regulations provide that no approval shall be given unless the GMO will 
“not have adverse socio-economic impacts”.299  However, the Regulations do not 
elaborate on what socio-economic considerations will be considered, how they will 
be analyzed, and how they will be factored into the decision making process.  For a 
biosafety regulatory system to be fair, predictable and transparent, the details 
surrounding the inclusion of socio-economic considerations in the decision making 
process should be spelled out in more detail than is currently available in the Draft 
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Biosafety Regulations.300  Without sufficient details, the system could be perceived as 
unfair to the applicants and the public who may not know how specific applications 
will be judged in this area.  
 
Without additional details on the interaction between socio-economic 
considerations and the decision-making process, it is unclear whether the biosafety 
regulatory regime of Uganda might not comply with the Protocol.301  Article 26 of 
the Protocol provides for taking into account socio-economic considerations of 
LMOs, but places conditions on that analysis.302   
 
First, it limits the socio-economic considerations to those effects that arise 
from “the impact of LMOs on the conservation and sustainable use of biological 
diversity, especially with regard to the value of biological diversity to the indigenous 
and local communities”.303  Thus, the plain language of Article 26 does not allow all 
socio-economic considerations of LMOs to be considered, but only those that 
directly arise from the impacts on biological diversity.304  Some stake holders believe, 
however, that the socio-economic impacts of LMOs are much broader and could 
include concerns such as “impacts on farmers’ incomes and welfare, cultural 
practices, community wellbeing, traditional crops and varieties, domestic science 
and technology, rural employment, indigenous peoples, food security, ethics and 
religion, consumer benefits, and ideas about agriculture, technology and society.305  
While those broader socio-economic considerations may be valid societal concerns 
relevant to GMOs, they may not be properly part of a biosafety regulatory system 
consistent with the Protocol.306 
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Secondly, the Protocol states that the inclusion of socio-economic 
considerations must be done in a manner that is consistent with other international 
obligations.307  In general, the WTO rules emphasize procedures for decision-making 
that primarily rely on scientific risk assessments and greatly limit the ability to make 
decisions based on non-safety concerns.  For example, Sanitary and Pyhtosanitary 
Standards (SPS) Agreement does not set forth a risk assessment procedure that 
includes both scientific and socio-economic considerations.308 Therefore, to try and 
comply with the plain language of Article 26 of the Protocol, countries such as 
Uganda which have included socio economic considerations in their biosafety 
regulatory regimes might tailor what they will consider to only what is allowed by 
Article 26 (e.g. socio-economic concerns directly linked to impacts on biodiversity). 
This may greatly narrow the scope of the socio-economic issues that the biosafety 
regulatory regime of Uganda can address.  Broader socio-economic considerations, 
however, might be addressed through other means, such as voluntary processes 
implemented by research institutions and companies or other laws and 
regulations.309 
 
It is suggested that any assessment of socio-economic considerations should 
ideally be conducted only when a GMO is ready to be commercially released.  There 
is an assumption that when a GMO is used in a contained laboratory or in a confined 
field trial, that GMO will not persist in the environment and will therefore have 
minimal effects on the population and the environment.  This therefore creates an 
impression that there will be no significant socio-economic considerations to 
analyze.  If a country is concerned about conducting GMO research as a whole, those 
issues should be addressed in a policy context.310  If socio-economic considerations 
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are to be analyzed for individual GMO applications, the proper time is when that 
organism is seeking approval for commercial use.311   
 
Taking into account of socio-economic considerations is now an important 
aspect of environmental management in Uganda.  This is illustrated by the case of 
Advocates Coalition for Development and Environment (ACODE) v Attorney General312 
where the court held that, if a change of land use permit was granted to the second 
respondent, it would be null and void as the alienation of a forest reserve could only 
be done after conducting an EIA, taking into account of the socio-economic impacts 
of the proposed project and after due consultation and participation of the local 
community as provided for by the law. 
 
7.3. Comparative Analysis 
Both the biosafety legislation of South Africa and the interim biosafety regulatory 
regime of Uganda do not have specific provisions providing for taking into account 
socio-economic considerations, but they have differently attempted to comply with 
Article 26 of the Protocol in their approval procedures.  The Draft Biosafety 
Regulations of Uganda provide that no approval for a GMO shall be given unless, 
where it has been established that the GMO will not have adverse socio-economic 
impacts.313  However, the draft biosafety regulations of Uganda do not state what 
socio-economic considerations will be considered.   
 
The range of socio-economic considerations contemplated in Article 26(1) of 
the protocol covers only those “considerations arising from the impact of LMOs on 
the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, especially with regard to 
the value of biological diversity to indigenous and local communities”.  This 
wording of the Protocol clearly indicates that not all socio-economic considerations 
may be taken into account, but rather only those that arise from the impact of LMOs 
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on biological diversity.  There is need for the Draft Biosafety Regulations of Uganda 
to specify what socio-economic considerations will be taken into consideration 
otherwise the applicants may perceive the whole system as unfair. 
 
The GMO Act and the GMO Amendment Act of South Africa also provide for 
taking into account of the socio-economic considerations although this is done in a 
vague manner.  Firstly, the taking into account of socio-economic issues is left at the 
consideration of the Council.  This means that these socio-economic considerations 
may easily be ignored by the council in the decision making process. Secondly, the 
GMO Amendment Act does not impose an obligation on the Council to take into 
account socio-economic considerations during the decision making process.  And 
lastly, by making the socio-economic considerations as an alternative to the EIA, 
there is creation of doubt as to whether the socio-economic considerations are ever 
taken onto account while making the final decision. 
 
It is apparent that, if both the biosafety regulatory systems of South Africa 
and Uganda are to fully comply with the Protocol, they should go an extra mile by 
incorporating provisions that specifically provide for taking into account the socio-
economic considerations just as the Protocol does under Article 26. Though, I must 
say that the provisions for taking into account the socio-economic considerations 
under the Draft Biosafety Regulations in Uganda are more elaborate than the 
provisions of the GMO Amendment Act of South Africa. 
 
8.0. Identification and Labeling 
 
  “Consumers can enquire from the seller of the food whether it is genetically modified or not 
and determine if they wish to consume it.” 
                                                     - Thoko Didiza, Minister of Agriculture and Land Affairs314 
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Identification and labeling of genetically modified organisms especially 
foods, serves as an important function of providing the public and consumers with 
information regarding GMOs.  However, its value also lies in its biosafety function 
regarding the traceability of a GMO, risk management and monitoring of the 
impacts of the GMO. 
 
8.1. South Africa 
The Cartagena Protocol under Article 18 contains a number of labeling requirements 
in respect of GMOs. For example, Article 18(2)(a) requires each party to provide for 
documentation accompanying GMOs for direct use as food, feed or processing to be 
clearly identified as “may contain” GMOs. The GMO Act and the GMO Amendment 
Act are both silent and do not contain provisions for the mandatory labeling 
regimes. The absence of mandatory labeling provisions undermines consumer 
choice, prevents users from protecting themselves from liability and impedes the 
monitoring of human health.315 
  
Currently, the only legal requirements regulating the labeling of food or food 
ingredients containing GMOs are provided by the Regulations made under the 
South African Foodstuffs, Cosmetics and Disinfectants Act.316  These regulations 
regarding the labeling and identification of GMOs also do not have provisions 
requiring the mandatory labeling of GMOs and products derived from GMOs. 
Labeling is only required where the consumption or the nutritional value of the 
foodstuffs differs significantly from the characteristic composition of the foodstuff in 
its non-modified form.317  A “significant difference” is defined in the regulations to 
exist only where the characteristics are different in terms of a scientific assessment of 
an appropriate analysis of data.318   In other word, the regulations do not impose 
                                                 
315
 Mayet M, op cit n142 at 3.  
316
 Republic of South Africa, Act 54 of 1972 and published in Government Gazette 25908 of 16 January 
2004. 
317
 In terms of Regulation 2 of the Regulations made under the South African Foodstuffs, Cosmetics and 
Disinfectants Act. 
318
 In terms of regulation 1 of the Regulations. 
  
 
94 
mandatory labeling for GMOs yet the libeling of GM foodstuffs is one of the most 
important ways of upholding the right of consumers to choose what they wish to 
consume.  It is also a way of tracing GMOs through the food chain, and boosts the 
demand for the segregation of GM and non-GM ingredients in the food chain.319   
 
The rationale for the South African government’s decision not to require the 
mandatory labeling of GMOs include: it would result in the increase of food prices, 
it is not practical, systems that identify and label GMOs are subject to error and 
abuse, segregation of GMOs and non-GMOs is expensive and lastly that GMOs are 
safe and therefore, the need for labeling as a warning is unnecessary.320  It is 
therefore, surprising that increased costs have been preferred as an excuse to avoid 
guaranteeing consumer choice. 
 
8.2. Uganda 
The Draft Biosafety Regulations have provisions for identification and labeling of 
GMOs under Regulation 11.  The Draft Biosafety Regulations provide that any GMO 
or its living product shall specify the relevant traits and characteristics given in 
sufficient detail for purposes of traceability.321  Regulation 11 further provides that, 
any product of a GMO shall be clearly labeled and packaged using the words in 
accordance with Annex II, part C, and shall comply with such further requirements, 
if any, imposed by the competent authority, or to indicate that is, or has been 
derived from, a GMO, and, where applicable, whether, it may cause reactions, 
allergies or other risks.322 
 
As discussed above, the interim biosafety regulatory regime of Uganda gives 
consumers an opportunity to decide on what they want, i.e. whether to consume 
GMO products or not to do so.  This is because it provides for the manufactures to 
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clearly label their products for easy identification.  In case a particular GMO or its 
products causes a negative impact on the environment or to human health it can 
easily be traced back to the producer or the manufacturer. 
 
8.3. Comparative Analysis 
Both the biosafety regulatory frameworks of South Africa and Uganda contain 
provisions on identification and labeling of GMOs.  But the Draft biosafety 
Regulations of Uganda to a greater extent comply with the provisions of Article 18 of 
the Cartagena Protocol that require each party to provide for documentation 
accompanying GMOs for direct use as food, feed or processing to be clearly 
identified as “may contain” GMOs.323  This is because regulation 11 of the Draft 
Biosafety Regulations expressly provides for mandatory labeling and identification 
of GMOs.  The draft regulations go a step further by requesting the producers to 
indicate whether these GMOs may cause reactions, allergies and other risks.  This 
gives the Ugandan consumer a freedom of choice.   
 
On the other hand the GMO Act and the GMO Amendment Act of South 
Africa do not fully comply with Article 18 of the Protocol, mainly because they do 
not have specific provisions that expressly provide for mandatory labeling of food 
and food ingredients that contain GMOs.  Identification and labeling of GMOs is 
only regulated by the regulations made under the South African Foodstuffs, 
Cosmetics and Disinfectants Act,324 but these regulations do not also expressly 
provide for mandatory labeling of GMOs.  As the case is, the South African 
consumer’s freedom of choice is undermined and prevents them from taking 
measures to protect themselves as some people are unwilling to knowingly consume 
food or food ingredients that contain GMOs, but because of the lack of mandatory 
labeling, they might have done so on so many occasions. 
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It is suggested that the interim biosafety regulatory regime of Uganda 
addresses the issue of identification and labeling of GMOs better than the biosafety 
legislation of South Africa.  The GMO Act and the GMO Amendment of South 
Africa should expressly provide for mandatory labeling of GMOs. 
 
C. Conclusion 
Implementation of the Protocol in South Africa and Uganda is at different levels of 
development.  The interim biosafety regulatory regime of Uganda is still a 
temporary mode of regulating biosafety as Uganda has not yet enacted the Biosafety 
Bill of 2005 into law.   On the other hand, South Africa has a fully fledged biosafety 
framework.  It is suggested that the interim biosafety regulatory regime of Uganda 
to a greater extent complies with the provisions of the Protocol while the biosafety 
legislation of South Africa still falls short of complying with the provisions of the 
Protocol.  The biosafety legislation of South Africa has been criticized for its 
inadequate provisions regarding:  identification and labeling, the precautionary 
principle, public participation and awareness, risk assessment and management and 
socio-economic considerations.  The direction that the biotechnology policy in South 
Africa takes holds significance that goes beyond the country’s borders as policy 
developments in South Africa are often seen as, whether legitimately or not, as the 
litmus test for how things will develop on the African continent as a whole including 
Uganda.   
 
            It is unfortunate that the GMO Act of South Africa does not fully comply with 
the Protocol.  Matters have been worsened by the fact that even the GMO 
Amendment Act that was hoped to salvage the situation has not done much to 
remedy the defects of the parent GMO Act.  This may however, be a blessing in 
disguise for countries like Uganda that have not adopted a substantive GMO 
legislation to learn a lesson or two from the GMO legislation of South Africa so that 
it does make the same mistakes.  Some of the major issues that have been identified 
by the comparative analysis of the biosafety regulatory frameworks of South Africa 
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and Uganda are summarized and set forth in table 1 below.  Conclusion and 
recommendations follow in the closing chapter. 
 
Table 1- Comparison of key selected provisions of the biosafety regulatory 
frameworks of Uganda and South Africa 
 UGANDA SOUTH AFRICA 
Scope Covers all GE organisms and 
addresses environmental and health 
issues but does not address food 
safety issues. 
Makes no reference to taking into 
account human health and is also not 
concerned with the transboundary 
movement, transit, handling and use of 
GMOs that may have adverse effects on 
biological diversity. 
Precautionary Principle Takes into account the 
precautionary principle. 
Makes no specific provision for taking 
into account the precautionary principle. 
Transparency More Transparent as it provides for 
giving the public information on 
applications and other processes. 
Less transparent as the public is given 
little information and also has limited 
access to information regarding 
applications. 
Advanced Informed 
Agreement Procedure (AIA) 
Has a component of the AIA 
procedure as consent obtained from 
the CA based on full disclosure 
before any activity is undertaken. 
Takes into account the AIA procedure 
though it does not have a specific 
provision titled AIA. 
Risk Assessment and 
Management 
Provides for risk Assessments 
before applications are considered 
and also provides for Risk 
Management measures even after 
the approval of the application. 
The Council may at its discretion request 
for a Risk Assessment or EIA to be 
carried out. 
Public Awareness and 
Participation 
Good involvement of the public in 
the decision making process, public 
is given information regarding 
applications and there is also public 
awareness campaigns. 
Inadequate public participation in the 
decision making process, limited public 
access to information regarding 
applications and no public awareness. 
Socio-economic 
Considerations 
Taken into account but no details 
are given. 
Taking into account of socio-economic 
considerations is at the discretion of the 
Council. 
Identification and labeling Provides for mandatory labeling 
and segregation requirements. 
No mandatory labeling and segregation 
requirements. 
                                          
Source: Generated by author 
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                                      CHAPTER FOUR: 
                        CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
The present chapter gives an overall conclusion of the study. Thereafter, it gives 
recommendations that will be useful in improving the biosafety regulatory 
frameworks of Uganda and South Africa hence making them more compliant with 
the provisions of the Protocol.  Finally this chapter outlines the future perspectives 
in the field of biosafety, modern biotechnology and GMOs.  
 
A. Conclusion 
The study has presented how South Africa and Uganda have each implemented the 
Protocol through their biosafety regulatory frameworks.  The two countries have 
recognized the benefits and potential risks posed by modern biotechnology, and 
have to differing extents, implemented legislation and regulations that have 
attempted to strike a balance ensuring the development of biotechnology and 
safeguarding the interests of the consumers and the environment.  A comparative 
analysis of the national biosafety policy evolution in South Africa and Uganda 
suggests that the market and trade dynamics and/or a general overreaching concern 
with technological leadership and international competitiveness are driving policy 
choices in the two countries.  
 
       The Cartagena Protocol has, nonetheless, influenced policy debates and 
regulatory and institutional developments in these two countries.  While South 
Africa has adopted substantive GMO legislation, Uganda has been working the past 
few years to establish a national biosafety regulatory system so that GMOs may 
safely be introduced in the agricultural sector.  At the time of writing the interim 
biosafety regulatory regime of Uganda comprised of the Draft National Biosafety 
and Biotechnology Policy, and the Draft Biosafety Regulations.  However, Uganda is 
in the process of adopting the Biosafety Bill of 2005, though it is not yet known how 
long this will take. 
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            It is evident from this study that, though the Cartagena Protocol is being 
implemented in the two countries, this process has not resulted in the harmonization 
of the domestic regulatory process as the study has clearly shown that of the two 
countries reviewed, South Africa falls short when it comes to the precautionary 
principle, public awareness and participation, effective risk assessments and labeling 
and traceability of GMOs.  Uganda on the other hand still has an opportunity to 
rectify the flaws in its biosafety regulatory framework since its still in draft form.  
 
            The prospects for South Africa and Uganda to choose their own paths in 
biosafety policy will to a larger extent be shaped by their domestic priorities and 
imperatives.  This is also keeping with the original intent of the Cartagena Protocol, 
which is to empower the GMO importing countries to make informed judgments 
about the impact of transgenic crops on their domestic ecological, health and 
agricultural systems.  It is suggested that the biosafety legislation of South Africa has 
tended to follow the permissive regulatory approach that has also been taken by 
countries such as the United States of America (USA). This is reflected in the recently 
passed GMO Amendment Act. This permissive approach to GMO regulation in 
South Africa may also be politically feasible in part because there is currently little 
widespread public knowledge or concern about transgenics.  On the other hand, the 
biosafety regulatory regime of Uganda has followed a precautionary approach 
which has also been taken by bodies such as the European Union (EU). 
 
 The absence of a shared global approach to GMO regulation, combined with 
disunity among leading agricultural trading partners in the developed countries, has 
the potential to open the policy space for autonomous decision-making in the 
developing countries.  This is partly because such conflicts will enable countries that 
desire to engage in trade with such countries to simultaneously combine openness 
and precaution towards transgenics in their domestic policies. 
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            In interpreting global biosafety rules such as the Cartagena Protocol, leading 
developing countries on the African continent such as South Africa are choosing 
different combinations of promotional precautionary elements, reflecting their 
position in global agricultural trade and the domestic balance of interests.  Where 
trade, market access and competitiveness are not driving the directions of biosafety 
policy, in many smaller developing countries such as Uganda, the implementation of 
the Protocol might be different, and in all likelihood more pronounced, insofar as 
visibility to biosafety concerns is concerned. 
 
            Notwithstanding the Protocol, the controversies around the global and 
domestic regulation of biotechnology especially between the proponents and the 
opponents of GMOs are unlikely to diminish in the near future, and instead look to 
escalate especially as the WTO weighs into the global debate.  Critics of stringent 
and tough biosafety regulatory frameworks argue that these rigid biosafety 
frameworks may interfere with free trade, while others argue that free trade should 
not be interpreted to mean uncushioned hazards to the environment and human 
health.  Nonetheless, this study supports the view that the globalization of modern 
biotechnology currently co-exists with regulatory diversity in the national biosafety 
policies of developing countries.  This is because such globalization and associated 
global regulation itself remains heterogeneous. 
 
B. Recommendations 
Through a detailed comparative analysis of the current and interim biosafety 
regulatory systems in South Africa and Uganda respectively, the study has 
identified a number of issues, that if addressed could improve those systems.  Some 
of the major recommendations from the study are as follows: 
 
1. The Draft Biosafety Regulations of Uganda require specific provisions clearly 
outlining their objective.  This should be in line with the objective of the 
Protocol.  The of the objective of the Draft Biosafety Regulations of Uganda 
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should aim at contributing to ensuring an adequate level of protection in the 
field of the safe transfer, handling and use of living modified organisms 
resulting from the use of modern biotechnology that may have adverse 
effects on the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, taking 
also into account risks to human health, and specifically focusing on 
transboundary movement and all this is in accordance with the precautionary 
approach.                                                                                                                         
 
The GMO Act and the GMO Amendment Act of South Africa require 
objective(s) that are consistent with the precautionary principle as provided 
for in the Protocol and Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration on Environment 
and Development.   
 
2. The Draft Biosafety Regulations of Uganda should make specific reference to 
Living modified organisms (LMOs) just as the Protocol does.  This will enable 
the draft regulations to have a wider scope of application.  The scope of the 
Draft Biosafety Regulations of Uganda should also take into account the 
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity and also take into 
account of risks to human health.   
 
The Scope of the GMO Act and the GMO Amendment Act of South 
Africa should include the aspects covered by the Scope of the Protocol.  Thus 
the GMO Act and the GMO Amendment Act of South Africa should apply to 
the transboundary movement, transit, handling and use of all LMOs, instead 
of only focusing on only GMOs and not their living products.  
 
3. It is recommended that under the Draft Biosafety Regulations of Uganda as 
the National Focal Point (NFP), the Ministry of Water, Lands and 
Environment could work hand in hand with the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Fisheries and Animal Husbandry. This is because when transgenic crops are 
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introduced into the environment, their primary use is mainly for commercial 
agriculture.  As the national competent authority, the Uganda National 
Council of Science and Technology (UNCST) should also be given a more 
clear definition of roles in relation to other institutions.  Furthermore, the 
UNCST statute should be amended to give the UNCST typical regulatory 
power and functions so that it is give adequate legal authority to regulate 
GMOs.  The UNCST should also consider establishing the office of a 
substantive administrative officer (the equivalent of the Registrar under the 
GMO Act of South Africa) that will be in charge of administering the interim 
biosafety regulatory regime and also issue permits.  
 
Under the GMO Act of South Africa, the ‘Council’ and the 
‘Committee’ should be more independent and constituted in a more all 
encompassing manner.  This includes representing all the interested parties 
such as the civil organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).  
There is also need to include other professionals like economists, 
anthropologists, environmentalists and sociologists so that the composition of 
the decision-making bodies is not scientifically skewed.  There is also need to 
check the excess powers that are exercised by the Registrar especially with 
regard to issuance of permits and enabling the public to gain access to 
information in his custody. South Africa should also consider establishing 
institutions that are the equivalent of the IBCs in Uganda.  Such institutions 
will effectively monitor biotechnology and GMOs from the sources where 
they are generated up to the application stage.  
 
The GMO Act of South Africa should also make provision for 
cooperate governance and making use of existing inspectorate bodies for the 
monitoring and enforcement of the provisions of the Act.  These inspectorates 
include the respective lead agencies for inspection reporting like customs and 
the bureau of standards. 
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4. Both the biosafety regulatory systems of South Africa and Uganda should 
adopt Advance Informed Agreement (AIA) procedures that are clearly 
outlined and comply with the Protocol. The Draft Biosafety Regulations of 
Uganda should be rectified to provide for the AIA procedure to apply not 
only to the ‘export’ but also most importantly to the ‘import’ of GMOs and 
their living products.  The AIA procedure under the GMO Act of South 
Africa should make specific reference to the ‘first intentional transboundary 
movement’ and GMOs in transit just like the Protocol does. 
 
           The time frames provided for under the biosafety legislation of South 
Africa regarding the AIA procedure should be expressly included in the 
provisions of the GMO legislation rather than leave such powers at the 
discretion of the Council. The GMO Act and the GMO Amendment Act 
should follow the same approach taken by the Draft Biosafety Regulations of 
Uganda prohibiting the re-exportation of banned GMOs and their living 
products to any another country.  This will also protect other countries from 
the hazards that may result from the banned GMOs. 
 
5. The GMO Act and the GMO Amendment Act of South Africa should adopt 
more elaborate and meaningful provisions on public awareness and 
participation. The GMO Act should clearly impose an obligation on the 
Council to take into account public participation before decisions are taken.  
The GMO Act and the GMO Amendment Act could also follow the approach 
that has been taken by the Draft Biosafety Regulations of Uganda by also 
providing for public awareness.  Placing of notices in the print media may 
not be enough to be considered as notice to the public since most of the 
population may not have access to newspapers but an alternative is resorting 
to the electronic media since it has wide coverage.  More time should be 
allocated for the public to make comment.  All EIA reports should be 
included in information given to the public, the content should be prescribed 
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and the public should not only be allowed to participate before a release but 
also during other activities that involve GMOs.  
 
6. Both the biosafety regulatory systems of South Africa and Uganda should set 
out the principles and parameters of the risk assessments.  This will ensure 
that reasonable time is accorded to risk assessments, as in most cases a 
shorter time frame is preferred and this affects the quality of the risk 
assessments.  Risk assessments should be made mandatory as part of the 
decision making process under the GMO Amendment Act.  This will increase 
transparency in the decision-making process. 
 
The GMO Act and the GMO Amendment Act of South Africa should 
adopt additional risk management measures.  Such measures include: 
periodic observation and submission of periodic reports by the applicant 
even after the approval of the GMO. 
 
7. Both the biosafety regulatory systems of South Africa and Uganda should 
adopt clear approach of taking into consideration socio-economic factors 
most especially in the decision making process.  The Draft Biosafety 
Regulations of Uganda should specify what socio-economic considerations 
would be taken into account. 
 
The GMO Act and the GMO Amendment Act of South Africa should 
not leave the consideration of socio-economic issues at the discretion of the 
Council, as the Council could easily ignore the socio-economic issues in the 
decision making process.  
 
8. The GMO Act of South Africa should expressly provide for mandatory 
labeling and segregation of food and food ingredients that contain GMOs so 
as to comply with Article 18 of the Cartagena Protocol.  Instead of being 
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regulated by the regulations made under the South African Foodstuffs, 
Cosmetics and Disinfectants Act,325 the GMO legislation of South Africa 
should specifically adopt provisions on identification and labeling of GMOs.  
This will enable consumers to make informed choices.  
 
9. The GMO Act and the GMO Amendment Act of South Africa should adopt 
more adequate oversight and compliance tools.  The GMO Act and the GMO 
Amendment Act should not rely predominantly on self-regulation.  There 
should be provisions for independent review of Environmental Impact 
Assessments (EIAs) and Risk Assessments, should improve on monitoring 
compliance and reporting and there should also be a provision for 
suspension and withdrawal of permits.   
 
10. The GMO Act and the GMO Amendment Act of South Africa should be more 
consistent through integration with other broader policy and regulatory 
framework.  Such policy and framework includes: the CBD at the 
international level and the PAJA, PAIA, NEMA and the Biodiversity Act at 
the national and domestic level. 
 
11. Uganda should enact legislation that will fully operationalise the Biosafety 
Regulations and the National Biotechnology and Biosafety Policy.  This is 
because at present the interim biosafety regulatory regime of Uganda is 
currently operating under the UNCST Statute.  This may expose the biosafety 
regulatory framework and all institutions established there under to legal 
challenges in the courts of law since it does not have legislation establishing 
it.  Alternatively, Uganda could ‘fast track’ the enactment of the Biosafety Bill 
of 2005.   
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12. Both Uganda and South Africa towards should work towards strengthening 
and consolidating the already existing regional approaches in regulating 
modern biotechnology.  The approach taken must also be in compliance with 
the African Model Law and the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. For the case 
of South Africa this can be done through SADC and for Uganda this can be 
done through the EAC.  This will enable the two countries to form collective 
approaches in regulating biotechnology and GMOs, since no single country 
can regulate GMOs with out cooperating or getting assistance from other 
countries.  This will also enable countries such as Uganda that do not yet 
have substantive GMO legislation to enact uniform and more practical 
biosafety regulatory frameworks. 
 
             To achieve the recommendations outlined above, it is important that 
stakeholders from all spheres of influence in South Africa and Uganda build 
alliances to establish effective legislation by lobbying and establishing consumer 
advocacy programmes at national, regional and international levels. 
 
C. Future Perspectives 
The field of modern biotechnology and GMOs is a wide and complex one that 
involves many challenging aspects.  Modern biotechnology is still a new facet in 
Africa and it leaves a lot of unresolved and unanswered questions. This calls for 
more similar comparative studies in other jurisdictions. The present study has 
revealed that in the field of modern biotechnology as in most other cases of potential 
risks and threats to the environment, international biosafety obligations (like the 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety) which impose restriction on the domestic 
management and implementation have been globally acceptable.  This is because the 
use of modern biotechnology in one country is perceived to have a possible effect to 
global commons or the territory of other states.  
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 Initially, during the Cartagena negotiations there was a wide spread 
assumption by the negotiators that the adverse effects of LMOs could only affect 
other states through trade. As a result, only trade regulations seemed politically 
agreeable as they do not affect the sovereignty of states with regard to the domestic 
management of GMOs, but rather seek to enable importing developing countries 
such as Uganda and South Africa to effectively exercise their existing sovereignty.  
 
               From an environmental point of view, and taking also into account 
approaches existing in the field of human rights law, this tendency as such may be 
criticized.  However, even if one accepts it as a fact, one may criticize the limitation 
of the Cartagena Protocol on trade, as there a many other aspects of “international 
dimensions”, which all reach beyond trade such as biotechnology. And one may 
doubt whether the effects of growing GMOs especially as food may, in the long run, 
be locally limitable in the developing countries.  The Cartagena Protocol therefore, 
constitutes an important recognition of the responsibility of the developed countries 
in terms of trade with developing countries.  It however, seems that the international 
regulation of biotechnology and GMOs will, in the long run, be insufficient to cope 
with the various kinds of transboundary environmental and health problems which 
biotechnology and GMOs pose. 
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                                             APPENDICES 
 
                                                       Appendix 1 
 
UGANDA NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 
                                                    P.O. BOX 6884  
                                                        KAMPALA 
 
APPLICATION TO INTRODUCE OR RELEASE GENETICALLY MODIFIED 
                           ORGANISMS (GMOs) INTO UGANDA 
 
PREAMBLE 
The applicant is required to answer as many questions as possible to facilitate evaluation 
of the application. 
 
Applicants are informed that assessments of the application will bear some financial 
cost, which will be met by the applicant. Applicants are required to provide further 
information as may be requested by National Biosafety Committee (NBC). 
 
NAME OF APPLICANT ........................................................................................ 
 
ADDRESS ……......................................................................................................... 
 
TELEPHONE NO. ....................... FAX ....................... E-MAIL ......................... 
 
SIGNATURE ...................................... 
 
NAMES OF ALL INSTITUTIONS INVOLVED IN THIS WORK, THEIR ROLES, 
PHYSICAL ADDRESSES AND THE CONTACT OF THE PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR. 
(Provide information on a sheet(s) of paper 
 
SOURCE OF FUNDS FOR THE ENTIRE WORK ......................................................... 
       (SUBMIT THIS PAGE WITH THE APPLICATION WRITE UP) 
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                                                          Appendix 2 
 
CHECKLIST FOR ACCORDING APPROVAL TO A LABORATORY/FACILITY 
TO CARRY OUT BIOTECHNOLOGICAL WORK 
 
It is suggested that various processes and procedures can be assessed qualitatively and 
quantitatively by means of a check list, for according approval to a laboratory for 
carrying out biotechnology work. The check lists suggested are as follows: 
 
1. Locality:  
-Urban 
-Rural 
-Peri-urban 
-Residential/Industrial 
-Mainland 
-Island 
2. Proximity to susceptible stock (e.g. Proximity between a wild potato population and a 
transgenic potato variety trial). 
3. Restricted public access -Fenced 
-Guards 
-Locks 
4. Staff identification -Staff movement restrictions. 
5. Safety against -Flood 
-Subsidence 
-Landslide 
-Earthquake 
-Other 
6. Is there room for development -Specify with diagram 
7. Building -Generally suitable 
-Old 
-New 
-Conventional/Prefabricated/Others. 
-Windows -Double 
-Sealed 
  
 
120 
-Shatterproof 
-Doors -Sealed 
-Self closing 
-Airlocks 
-Vision panel 
-Marked hazard signs 
-Walls - Suitable surfaces 
-Floors - Easy to clean 
- Non slippery 
- Ceiling - Sealed entry of services 
- Lighting - As required 
- Drainage - Free drainage 
- Forced drainage 
8. Laboratory fittings: 
-Benches -Surfaces 
-Impervious 
-Continuous 
-Safety equipments-Microbiological safety cabinets 
     Class 1 
     Class 2 
     Class 3 
-Protected centrifuges 
-Protected sonicators 
-Protected homogenisers 
-Taps -Hand 
-Wrist 
-Elbow 
-Foot 
-Electronic 
-Space -Adequate 
-Overcrowded 
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9. Ventilation: Infective agent handling area 
-Air pressure -Negative to atmosphere 
-Negative pressure 
-Monitoring -Manometer 
-Frequency observation 
-Recording 
-Electronic 
-Temperature control 
-Humidity control 
-Air locks -Double air lock 
-Simple (with door flaps) 
-Separately ventilated 
-Exhaust air -H.E.P.A. filters 
-Single 
-Double 
-Quality of Filter 
-Monitoring 
-Testing methods 
-Filter Container -Ladder Frame 
-Canisters 
-Input air -Filtered 
-Quality 
-Temperature. 
-Input/Extract -Interlocked 
-Standby Power Generating System -Specify capacity etc. 
10. Range of work - Research 
-Vaccine production 
-Large animal work 
-Small animal work 
-Diagnostic 
-Other 
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11. Effluent treatment -Heat 
-Chemical 
-Irradiation 
-Other 
12. Storage of infectious material 
-Location 
Minus 20 C 
Minus 70C 
Minus 60C 
13. Pass-out facilities -Autoclave 
-Fumigation cabinets 
-Monitoring 
-Photocopying 
-Facsimile machine (Fax machine) 
14. Structure-Disease Security Department 
15. Disease Security Regulations 
16. Other Security 
17. Fire precautions 
18. Staff training 
19. Staff Selection 
20. Visitor regulations 
21. Procedures and provisions for emergencies 
 
NB. The check list has been prepared keeping in view of the standard requirement of 
BL1 to BL3 laboratories. 
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                                                            Appendix 3                                            
                                              REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA 
                                            DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE 
                                                 GMO Act, 1997 (Act No. 15 of 1997) 
 
                                                     DIRECTORATE GENETIC RESOURCES 
                                                Private Bag X973, Pretoria, 0001 
                        Harvest House Room 261, 30 Hamilton Street, Arcadia, Pretoria, 0002 
                         Tel: 12 n319 6253, Fax: 12 319 6329, E-mail: MichelleV@nda.agric.za 
 
APPLICATION FOR AUTHORISATION TO IMPORT LMO’S INTO SOUTH   
              AFRICA THAT ARE DESTINED FOR CONTAINED USE 
 
This document must be accompanied by (a) a cover letter, (b) completed application for 
the intended use of the LMO in SA (i.e. contained use or fast track application form) and 
(c) the correct fee in terms of the Genetically Modified Organisms Act, 1997 (Act No. 15 
of 1997). 
 
Activities with GMOs for research and academic purposes, conducted at containment 
levels 1 and 2 (determined through a risk assessment conducted by the officer in charge) 
within a laboratory or growth room in an academic or research facility, are exempted 
from the requirement of a contained use permit in terms of Regulation 2(2). A contained 
use permit is required once the research is scaled up from basic research to product 
development, or when conducting the activities in a greenhouse or when the 
containment level is 3 and above. 
 
1. Name, address and contact details of the importer (contact point for further 
     information) 
2. Contact details of the Competent National Authority in the Part of Export. 
3. Name, address and contact details of the exporter. 
4. Common name, scientific name, commercial name or unique identifier code (OECD) 
     of the living modified organism, as well as the domestic classification, if any, of the 
     biosafety level of the living modified organisms (LMO’s)? 
5. The intended date/dates of the transboundary movement, if known? 
6. Port of entry within South Africa (name and city)? 
7. A description of the nucleic acid or the modification introduced, the technique used, 
    and the resulting characteristics of the LMO. 
8. The regulatory status of the LMO within the Party of Export. 
9. The intended use of the LMO in SA and what was it used for in the Party of Export? 
10. The quantity or volume of the LMO to be imported into South Africa? 
11. A complete list of the varieties/hybrids of the LMO. 
12. Methods and plans for safe handling, storage, transport and use, including  
      packaging, labeling, documentation, disposal and contingency procedures. 
13. Methods and plans used in South Africa for monitoring of the LMO. 
14. Emergency procedures that will be applied in South Africa in the event of an  
      accident with the LMO. 
15. An evaluation of the foreseeable impacts, in particular any pathogenic and 
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      ecologically disruptive impacts of the LMO’s. 
16. A completed affidavit to declare that the information provided is factually correct. 
 
Directions for the potential importer: 
(This page must be excluded from the documents submitted to the Registrar’s office) 
 
• Please complete all sections of the form CLEARLY. 
• A template of the affidavit is obtainable from the Registrar’s office. 
• Please provide an application with confidential information and an additional 
   application containing no confidential information. The latter application will be made 
   available for public scrutiny. 
• Every potential importer must submit a notification to the competent national 
    authority within SA. 
This notification shall contain of – 
                                 - A letter indicating the intent of the potential importer 
                                 - Completed import application form 
                                 - Completed application for intended use of the GMO in SA 
                                 - The correct fee in terms of the Genetically Modified Organisms 
                                   Act, 1997 
• Contact details of the competent national authority in SA is the following: 
       Dr JB Jaftha 
       Registrar: Genetically Modified Organisms 
       Senior Manager: Genetic Resources 
       Private Bag X973 
       Pretoria 
       0001 
       Tel: 27 12 319 6214 
       Fax: 27 12 319 6329 
       E-mail: SMGRM@nda.agric.za 
• Please take note that the Registrar’s office may request additional information to the 
   notification. 
• The Registrar’s office will acknowledge receipt of the notification in writing. 
• The acknowledgement shall state – 
                                 - the date of receipt of the notification; 
                                 - whether the notification contains the required information; and 
                                 - whether a permit is issued or not 
• A permit for importation will only be issued once the Registrar has received the 
   necessary clearance by the Executive Council. 
• LMO’s exempted from requirement of an import permit under the GMO Act are not 
   necessarily exempted from requirement of an import permit in terms of the Biosafety 
   Protocol. 
• A Party is a Party in terms of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. 
• These procedures are also applicable for imports from non-Parties to the Cartagena 
    Protocol on Biosafety. 
• The potential importer is responsible for adhering to the requirements of and 
    obtaining the consent from the Party of Export for the proposed transboundary 
    movement. 
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• Please take note that although a notification as required by Article 8 of the CPB is 
    not required for LMO’s intended for contained use, SA requires such a notification as 
    described earlier, and any other applicable procedures, within its domestic regulatory 
    framework. 
 
 
AFFIDAVIT/VERKLARING/STATEMENT 
(moet ingevul word in teenwoordigheid van ‘n Kommissaris van Ede / to be completed 
in the presence of a Commissioner of Oaths) 
 
Ek/I…..……………………………………………………………………………………………. 
ID-Nommer/Number…………………………………………. Ouderdom/Age …..……….. 
Woonadres/ Residing address …………………………………………………………………. 
Werkadres/working address ……………………………………………………………….….. 
Tel ………………………..(w) ……………………………(h) ……………………………(cell) 
Verklaar onder eed in Afrikaans / bevestig in Afrikaans - 
Declare under oath in English / confirm in English – 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Ek is vertroud met die inhoud van bostaande verklaring en begryp dit. Ek het geen 
beswaar/het beswaar teen die aflê van die voorgeskrewe eed. Ek beskou die 
voorgeskrewe eed/bevestiging as bindend vir my gewete. 
I am familiar with, and understand the contents of this declaration. I have no 
objection/have objection to taking the prescribed oath. I consider the prescribed oath as 
binding to my conscience. 
Plek/Place: ………………………………….. Datum/Date: ……………………….. 
Tyd/Time: …………………………………… 
Handtekening/Signature: ……………………………………… 
 
Ek sertifiseer dat bostaande verklaring deur my afgeneem is en dat die verklaarder 
erken dat hy/sy vertroud is met die inhoud van hierdie verklaring and dit begryp. 
Hierdie verklaring is voor my beëdig en verklaarder se handtekening/merk/ 
duimafrduk is in my teenwoordigheid daarop aangebring. 
I certify that the above statement was taken from me and that the deponent has 
acknowledge that he/she knows and understands the contents of the statement. The 
statement was sworn to/affirmed before me and deponent’s signature/mark/thumb 
print was placed thereon in my presence. 
Te/At: …………………………………op/on ………………………………om/at ………… 
………………………………………………….. 
Kommisaris van Ede/Commissioner of Oaths 
(inligting i.v.m. fisiese en posadres moet verskaf word, bv. Stempel van die polisiestasie 
details to be provided on physical and postal address e.g. stamp of police station) 
…………………………………………………. 
Magsnommer /Rang/Naam – drukskrif 
Force number/Rank/Name - print 
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                                                               Appendix 4 
                                            
                                            REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA 
                                         DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE 
                                             GMO Act, 1997 (Act No. 15 of 1997) 
 
                                                     DIRECTORATE GENETIC RESOURCES 
                                                Private Bag X973, Pretoria, 0001 
                        Harvest House Room 261, 30 Hamilton Street, Arcadia, Pretoria, 0002 
                         Tel: 12 n319 6253, Fax: 12 319 6329, E-mail: MichelleV@nda.agric.za 
 
APPLICATION FOR AUTHORISATION TO IMPORT GMO’S THAT HAVE 
GENERAL RELEASE AND/OR COMMODITY CLEARANCE STATUS IN SOUTH 
AFRICA 
 
Directions to the applicant: 
  
• This application form should only be utilized to apply for (i) importation of a 
    particular GMO event that already has general release status in South Africa, or (b) a 
    commodity import of several GMO events previously approved in terms of 
    commodity clearance. 
• When an application is made for a commodity import, the application must be 
   accompanied by a declaration from the Competent National Authority within the 
   Party of Export, stating the GMO events commercially available within the Party of 
   Export. 
• Please complete all sections of this questionnaire. Please provide reasons if a particular 
   section of this form is not completed (“not applicable” will not be accepted – one must  
   provide reasons why a particular question is not applicable). 
• Please provide one copy of the application with confidential information for use by 
   the regulatory bodies appointed in terms of the Genetically Modified Organisms Act, 
    1997 (Act no. 15 of 1997). This copy must be clearly marked: CONFIDENTIAL 
• Please provide one hard and an electronic copy of the application containing no 
   confidential information. This copy must be clearly marked: NON- 
   CONFIDENTIAL, and may be made available for public scrutiny. 
• A Party is a Party in terms of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. 
• An application for an import permit must reach the office of the registrar well in  
   advance and it is strongly advised that the importer must be in a possession of a  
   valid import permit under the GMO Act before the consignment leaves the country of 
   export. 
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APPLICATION FOR AUTHORISATION TO IMPORT GMO’S THAT HAVE 
GENERAL RELEASE AND/OR COMMODITY CLEARANCE STATUS IN SOUTH 
AFRICA 
 
1. Name, address and contact details of the importer (contact point for further  
    information). 
2. Contact details of the Competent National Authority in the Party of Export. 
3. Name, address and contact details of the exporter. 
4. Common name (e.g. maize) of the genetically modified organism(s) that may be 
    present in the consignment? 
5. Scientific name (e.g. Zea mays) of the genetically modified organism(s) that may be 
    present in the consignment? 
6. Commercial name/event (e.g. MON810) of the genetically modified organism(s) that 
    may be present in the consignment? 
7. Unique identifier(s) of the genetically modified organism(s) that you have listed 
    above? 
8. A complete list of the varieties/hybrids of the GMO event(s) contained in the 
    consignment. 
    (For commodity imports: It is the responsibility of the applicant to obtain a written 
    indication from the responsible authority in the Party of Export of the GMO events 
    that may be contained in the consignment. If this certificate is not available at the 
    date of making your application due to delays in the Party of Export, please attach 
    the latest confirmation, i.e. confirmation received within the shortest time period from 
    this application, of the events contained in a consignment originating from the same 
    Party of Export.) 
9. The intended date/dates of the transboundary movement, if known? 
10. Port of entry within South Africa (name and city)? 
      (Please take note that a permit is issued per consignment and per port of entry. We 
      do not issue permits that are applicable for multiple consignments being discharged 
      at different ports of entry.) 
11. The regulatory status of the GMO within the Party of Export. 
12. Authorised use of the GMO in the Party of Export? 
13. Please provide details pertaining to the intended (contained) use of the GMO in SA? 
      (If the GMO event(s) contained in the consignment to be imported do not have 
      general release clearance and/or commodity clearance at the time that this 
      application is made, your application will not be approved.) 
14. The quantity or volume of the GMO to be imported into South Africa? 
15. A completed affidavit to declare that the information provided is factually correct. 
      The following questions must be completed in the case of a commodity import: 
16. Methods and plans used for safe handling, storage, transport and use, including 
      packaging, labeling, documentation, disposal and contingency procedures. 
17. Methods and plans used in South Africa for monitoring of the GMO. 
18. Emergency procedures that will be applied in South Africa in the event of an  
      accident with the GMO. 
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AFFIDAVIT/VERKLARING/STATEMENT 
(moet ingevul word in teenwoordigheid van ‘n Kommissaris van Ede / to be completed 
in the presence of a Commissioner of Oaths) 
 
Ek/I………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
ID-Nommer/Number…………………………………………. Ouderdom/Age …………… 
Woonadres/ Residing address …………………………………………………………………. 
Werkadres/working address ……………………………………………………….………….. 
Tel ………………………..(w) ……………………………(h) ……………………………(cell) 
Verklaar onder eed in afrikaans / bevestig in afrikaans - 
Declare under oath in English / confirm in English – 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Ek is vertroud met die inhoud van bostaande verklaring en begryp dit. Ek het geen 
beswaar/het beswaar teen die aflê van die voorgeskrewe eed. Ek beskou die 
voorgeskrewe eed/bevestiging as bindend vir my gewete. 
I am familiar with, and understand the contents of this declaration. I have no 
objection/have objection to taking the prescribed oath. I consider the prescribed oath as 
binding to my conscience. 
Plek/Place: ………………………………….. Datum/Date: ……………………….. 
Tyd/Time: …………………………………… 
Handtekening/Signature: ……………………………………… 
 
Ek sertifiseer dat bostaande verklaring deur my afgeneem is en dat die verklaarder 
erken dat hy/sy vertroud is met die inhoud van hierdie verklaring and dit begryp. 
Hierdie verklaring is voor my beëdig en verklaarder se handtekening/merk/ 
duimafrduk is in my teenwoordigheid daarop aangebring. 
I certify that the above statement was taken from me and that the deponent has 
acknowledge that he/she knows and understands the contents of the statement. The 
statement was sworn to/affirmed before me and deponents’ signature/mark/thumb 
print was placed thereon in my presence. 
Te/At: …………………………………op/on ………………………………om/at ………… 
 
………………………………………………….. 
Kommisaris van Ede/Commissioner of Oaths 
(inligting i.v.m. fisiese en posadres moet verskaf word, bv. Stempel van die polisiestasie 
details to be provided on physical and postal address e.g. stamp of police station) 
 
…………………………………………………. 
Magsnommer /Rang/Naam – drukskrif 
Force number/Rank/Name - print 
 
 
 
